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Abstract
Although international business firms proliferate, there is no international bankruptcy system. Instead, bankruptcy law remains
a matter for individual states. The failure of a multinational firm
therefore raises difficult questions of conflict and cooperation
among national bankruptcy laws. In the discourse over the appropriate design for an international bankruptcy system,
universalism has long held sway as the dominant idea, embraced nearly universally by bankruptcy scholars. Universalism
offers a simple and elegant blueprint for international bankruptcy. Under universalism, the bankruptcy regime of the debtor
firm’s home country would govern worldwide, enjoying global
reach to treat all of the debtor’s assets and claimants.
Despite its conceptual dominance and appeal, universalism has
yet to find vindication in any concrete policy enactments. No
universalist arrangements exist. While recent challenges to universalism have emerged, the current lively debate over
universalism and rival proposals focuses almost exclusively on
their comparative efficiencies. This article provides a new perspective and a novel critique of universalism. Applying insights
from elementary game theory and international relations theory,
this Article shows that universalism suffers serious feasibility
constraints: it is politically implausible and likely impossible.
Even for states interested in establishing universalist arrangements, they will be unable to do so. They will find themselves in
a prisoners’ dilemma with no ready solution. The Article concludes that universalism holds only dubious promise as a
prescription for international bankruptcy cooperation.

Introduction
Scholars of international bankruptcy are caught in the grip of a failed
idea: universalism. Generations of scholars have advanced the universalist mantra: i.e., that the assets and liabilities of a multinational firm in
bankruptcy should be administered by one court applying one nation’s
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bankruptcy laws on a worldwide basis. Until recently, this advancement
of universalism occurred largely without challenge. Even with recent
challenges, however, universalism dominates the debate, as scholars attempt to debunk its claimed efficiency advantages.
This debate over universalism is misguided because, simply put,
universalism will not work. In this article, I argue that universalism is
politically implausible and likely impossible. No nation has adopted it,
and it is unlikely that any will. States will be reluctant to commit to enforcing the decisions of foreign courts applying foreign bankruptcy laws
against local parties. In addition, even assuming states exist that would
be interested in universalism, structural problems will preclude the
1
achievement of workable universalist cooperation. I rely on elementary
game theory and international relations theory to show that even states
that prefer universalism will find themselves in a prisoners’ dilemma
with no ready solution. Impediments to cooperation will afflict even bilateral universalist ambitions, with multilateral universalism all the more
unlikely. Because the claimed superior efficiency of universalism implic2
itly depends on its widespread adoption—if not ubiquity —this
implausibility of multilateral universalism is particularly damning to the
universalist cause. Universalism should be shelved, and the terms of the
scholarly debate should shift to more plausible goals.
Though international firms abound, with assets, employees, and
3
creditors all over the world, there is no international bankruptcy system.
Instead, bankruptcy law remains a matter for individual states. The failure of a multinational firm therefore raises difficult conflicts among
1. Several impediments make cooperation unlikely. The universalist commitment suffers
from crippling indeterminacy, so that even states interested in cooperating will not commit. A
workable universalist system also depends on widespread adoption by many individual states,
a structural requirement that makes universalist cooperation well-nigh impossible. See infra
Part IV.
2. See infra Part IV.D.
3. DaimlerChrysler provides one nice example. It resulted from the merger of two auto
makers—one German and one U.S.—that before the merger were already major players in their
respective domestic auto industries. The combined firm maintains group headquarters in both
Stuttgart, Germany, and Auburn Hills, Michigan, and its common shares are widely held
by European, U.S., and other international investors. See DaimlerChrysler, Annual Report
2000 17. The company touts its common stock, the “DaimlerChrysler Share,” as
“the world’s first truly global share.” See DaimlerChrysler Investor Relations http://
www.daimlerchrysler.com/investor/investor_e.htm (last visited Aug. 4, 2001). In addition to its
German and U.S. operations, DaimlerChrysler owns a 34% stake in Mitsubishi Motors Corporation (Japan) and a 9% stake in Hyundai Motor Company (South Korea). See DaimlerChrysler,
Annual Report, supra at 44. As of December 31, 2000, DaimlerChrysler employed 416,501
people worldwide, of whom 196,861 worked in Germany and 123,633 worked in the United
States See id. at 55.

3/19/02 10:28 AM

TUNGTYPE.DOC

4

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 23:1

national bankruptcy laws,4 as well as jurisdictional conflicts among national courts attempting to apply those laws.
States have traditionally pursued a territorial approach. Each state
applies its own laws with respect to the debtor’s assets and creditors
within its own borders. The result is a piecemeal, territorial disposition
of the firm’s assets and uncoordinated, territory-based distribution of
value to creditors, in which each territory typically favors local creditors.
This territorial approach has long been the bête noire of international
bankruptcy scholars, on both efficiency and fairness grounds. One fundamental purpose of bankruptcy law is to halt the destructive race of
creditors that otherwise occurs when a firm suffers financial distress.
Ideally, bankruptcy imposes a collective proceeding that halts individual
creditor collection efforts and attempts to preserve whatever going con5
cern value the firm may have, in order to benefit creditors as a group.
By contrast, piecemeal territorial asset disposition is inefficient; it may
6
diminish the overall value of firm assets. Uncoordinated territory-based
distributions to creditors also raise fairness concerns: similarly situated
creditors of the firm should be treated equally, regardless of their loca7
tion. Translating these bankruptcy law goals into the international
context, however, has been problematic.
While various proposals for international bankruptcy reform have
emerged, historically, scholars have almost invariably advocated a uni8
versalist approach. The fundamental tenet of universalism is “one law,
4. In addition to bankruptcy law, the conflict would include each state’s other debtorcreditor laws as well.
5. See generally Frederick Tung, Confirmation and Claims Trading, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev.
1684, 1689 (describing corporate reorganization under U.S. law) [hereinafter, Tung, Confirmation and Claims Trading]; Philip R. Wood, Principles of International Insolvency 1
(1995) (discussing general principles of insolvency).
6. Firm A’s assets are likely to be worth more as an integrated operation across international borders than if the State A assets are segregated from those in State B. For instance,
suppose the firm manufactures integrated circuits. It designs the products in State A and mass
produces them in State B. The design and manufacturing operations are very likely worth
more working in tandem than if they are cleaved along national boundaries and sold separately. Even if the firm is liquidated, an orderly liquidation will yield more value than the
uncoordinated collection activities of individual creditors.
7. See infra Part I.
8. The dominance and longevity of the universalist idea is evidenced by its appearance
in 1888 in the very first volume of the Harvard Law Review, in which Professor John Lowell
of the Harvard Law School made the case for “a single proceeding . . . at a single place.” John
Lowell, Conflict of Laws as Applied to Assignments of Creditors, 1 Harv. L. Rev. 259, 264
(1888). Subsequent scholarship to the present has regularly made the case for universalism.
See, e.g., Donald T. Trautman, Foreign Creditors in American Bankruptcy Proceedings, 29
Harv. Int’l L.J. 49, 58 (1988); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law in Global
Insolvencies, 17 Brook. J. Int’l L. 499, 515 (1991) [hereinafter Westbrook, Choice of Avoid-
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one court,” and in its most commonly described implementation, the
bankruptcy regime of the debtor firm’s home country—its courts and
9
laws—should govern. That regime should have extraterritorial reach to
treat all of the debtor’s assets and claimants, displacing the local bankruptcy laws of other countries to the extent necessary to accomplish a
unified administration.
The basic premise to universalism is that national borders should not
interfere with business restructuring. Maximizing asset value and distributing that value among claimants are economic activities. Their
proper conduct should not be affected by the location of particular assets
or the territorial attributes of claimants. A unified administration under
the home country bankruptcy regime offers predictability, efficiency, and
10
fairness, avoiding the problems that a state-by-state piecemeal approach
would present.
The scholarly attraction to universalist cooperation in the
international bankruptcy context is not an isolated phenomenon. In many
issue areas, globalization has placed enormous strains on once domestic
regulatory regimes, forcing governments and their regulators to adapt
11
national regulation to govern international commerce. When crossborder economic activity attracts attention from regulators in several
ance Law]; Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 Mich. L.
Rev. 2276 (2000) [hereinafter Westbrook, Global Solution]. See also infra Part I.A.
9. See, e.g., Donald T. Trautman et al., Four Models for International Bankruptcy, 41
Am. J. Comp. L. 573 (1993); Jay Lawrence Westbrook & Donald T. Trautman, Conflict of
Laws Issues in International Insolvencies, in Current Developments in International
and Comparative Corporate Insolvency Law 655, 667 (Jacob S. Ziegel ed., 1994)
(“[T]he goal in developing choice of law rules in insolvency should be to apply the homecountry law as pervasively as possible.”); Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law, supra note 8,
at 515.
10. See infra Part I.A.
11. In addition to bankruptcy, antitrust, securities regulation, banking law, labor law, and
environmental regulation are other salient examples of once domestic regulatory structures
now being pressed into international service. See Andrew T. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1501 (1998); Amir N. Licht, Games Commissions Play:
2x2 Games of International Securities Regulation, 24 Yale J. Int’l L. 61 (1999); Enrico
Colombatto & Jonathan R. Macey, A Public Choice Model of International Economic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 925 (1996) (discussing
Basle Accords and international bank capital requirements); Brian A. Langille, Competing
Conceptions of Regulatory Competition in Debates on Trade Liberalization and Labour Standards, in International Regulatory Competition and Coordination: Perspectives on
Economic Regulation in Europe and the United States 479 (William Bratton et al.
eds., 1996) [hereinafter International Regulatory Competition]; Alan V. Deardorff,
International Conflict and Coordination in Environmental Policies, in Economic Dimensions
in International Law: Comparative and Empirical Perspectives 248 (Jagdeep S.
Bhandari & Alan O. Sykes eds., 1997) [hereinafter Economic Dimensions].
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states, these states compete with each other over the primacy of their
12
regulatory structures. Cooperative solutions to these competitive
tensions have been proposed in other areas besides international
13
bankruptcy. Cooperative ideas are intuitively appealing. International
cooperation seems intellectually elegant. It is optimistic, enlightened and
progressive. It signals a forward-thinking, cosmopolitan, one-world
14
perspective. By contrast, territorial competition seems provincial,
narrow-minded, and piggish.
Efforts at international cooperation may not always be benign, how15
16
ever. Some may be driven by perverse motives, or generate perverse
17
results. And some attempts at cooperation are simply futile. Tensions
between idealistic cooperative inclinations and the realities of territorial
competition have generated new thinking about international regulation.
12. For example, scholars have debated the appropriate extraterritorial reach of U.S. securities regulation. Compare Merritt B. Fox, The Political Economy of Statutory Reach: U.S.
Disclosure Rules in a Globalizing Market for Securities, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 696 (1998) (arguing for “issuer nationality” approach to U.S. securities disclosure—i.e., regime should apply
only to U.S.-based issuers), with Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1855 (1997)
(arguing for territorial “transaction location” approach in which U.S. securities regulation
applies only to transactions occurring within the United States). See also Stephen J. Choi and
Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities
Regulation, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 903 (1998) [hereinafter Choi & Guzman, Portable Reciprocity]
(proposing that issuer of securities be permitted to select the securities regulatory regime applicable to it).
13. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 Am. J.
Int’l L. 1 (1997) (arguing for integrated international antitrust regulation); Deardorff, supra
note 11, at 248 (analyzing need for international environmental policy coordination).
14. This abiding faith in internationalism is not new. In Utopia, even treaties are unnecessary for international cooperation:
‘What is the use of a treaty,’ they ask, ‘as though nature of herself did not sufficiently bind one man to another?’ [T]he Utopians . . . think . . . that the fellowship
created by nature takes the place of a treaty, and that men are better and more firmly
joined together by good will than by pacts, by spirit than by words.
St. Thomas More, Utopia 116, 118 (Edward Surtz, S.J., ed., Yale University Press 1964)
(1516).
15. Machiavelli saw this aspect of international politics clearly. See Machiavelli, The
Prince 38 (Quentin Skinner & Russell Price, eds., Cambridge University Press 1988) (1532)
(advising against particular types of alliances).
16. See Colombatto & Macey, supra note 11, at 926 (arguing that international coordination among banking and securities regulators is not driven by concerns for the public interest,
but by regulators’ desire to preserve their regulatory authority and to avoid their own obsolescence in the face of globalization).
17. See Paul Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization of International
Commercial Law, 39 Va. J. Int’l L. 743, 786 (1999) (asserting that widespread adoption of
the United Nations Commission on International TradeLaw Model Insolvency Law would
increase uncertainty, rather than reduce it).
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Hopeful internationalism has been tempered by states’ stubborn and consistent pursuit of their own national interests. Moreover, recent scholarly
consensus shows that competition may be beneficial in some regulatory
18
contexts, while admittedly destructive in others. Likewise, while cooperation may be appropriate for some situations, it is not an unmitigated
19
blessing.
This clash between the cooperative impulse and the assertion of territorial self-interest is particularly pronounced in international
bankruptcy. Ideal cooperation promises universal benefits, but states
have enduring interests at stake in insisting on their territorial preroga20
tives, as they have historically done. As a practical matter, universalist
cooperation has not been forthcoming. “Despite the near-unanimous
support of the academic community, policymakers have chosen not to
21
adopt universalism.”
Rival reform proposals have recently emerged.22 These challenges to
universalism have focused largely on its hypothetical efficiency. Even if
universalism were adopted in the form advocated by its proponents, the
23
argument goes, it would be less efficient than rival proposals. My concern for universalism’s political feasibility, however, precedes this
efficiency question. The economics of universalism are irrelevant unless
some critical mass of states are willing to commit to it. Its promised
benefits are merely academic. Universalists and their critics disagree as
to whether the world will realistically ever be ready to cooperate at the

18. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Regulation: Some Generalizations, in
Regulatory Competition and Economic Integration 3, 24 (Daniel C. Esty & Damien
Geradin eds., 2001) (discussing differing structures of competition in different regulatory
areas); Colin Scott, Institutional Competition and Coordination in the Process of Telecommunications Liberalization, in International Regulatory Competition, supra note 11, at
381 (comparing U.S. and European telecommunications regulatory policies in light of domestic constitutional and institutional arrangements).
19. See generally Regulatory Competition and Economic Integration, supra note
18; International Regulatory Competition, supra note 11.
20. The history of European Union negotiations over a cross-border insolvency convention provides one salient example. Despite the best of universalist intentions, the members
have been unsuccessful in overcoming their individual territorialist leanings. See infra Parts
IV.B.1. and V.B.
21. Andrew T. Guzman, International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism, 98 Mich.
L. Rev. 2177, 2184 (2000) [hereinafter Guzman, In Defense of Universalism]. See also infra
note 64 and accompanying text.
22. A recent edition of the Michigan Law Review is devoted to debating the merits of
universalism and two competing proposals: cooperative territoriality and private ordering. See
Colloquy: International Bankruptcy, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2177 (2000).
23. See infra Part I.B.
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level that a universalist system would require.24 A critical question, then,
is how likely is universalism?
The design of a workable system of international bankruptcy is essential given the relentless integration of the global economy. For
example, already a third of large U.S.-based publicly traded companies
25
own foreign assets. Soon, all large public company bankruptcies will be
26
international bankruptcies.
An international political perspective is long overdue. The idea of
universalism has been around for some time. The modern debate over
universalism and rival proposals has gone a number of rounds and still
lacks for any discussion of universalism’s political feasibility. Any notion
that international politics may matter in the development of cooperative
24. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2216, 2251 (2000) [hereinafter LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality];
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and
Choice of Forum, 65 Am. Bankr. L.J. 457, 468 (1991) [hereinafter Westbrook, Theory and
Pragmatism]. See also infra note 55 and accompanying text.
25. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist
Approach, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 696, 724 (1999) [hereinafter LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy].
26. As international business firms proliferate, the focus on international bankruptcy reform has also intensified.
Insolvency law rarely attracts much more than a fleeting interest and ranks low on
any government’s reform agenda. The commercial community, though sometimes
aroused, is also largely disinterested in the subject. Legal and other scholars rarely
concern themselves with insolvency law issues. It is thus quite remarkable that, during the last decade of the last century, corporate insolvency laws and related
practices should have assumed an unparalleled national, regional and global importance.
Ronald Winston Harmer, Insolvency Law Reforms in the Asian and Pacific Region: Report of
the Office of the General Counsel on TA 5795-REG: Insolvency Law Reforms, 1 Law and
Policy Reform at the Asian Development Bank 10 (April 2000) (emphasis supplied).
The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the U.N. Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), the Asian Development Bank, and several other multilateral institutions have initiated active international and comparative bankruptcy law research agendas. See infra notes
251–259 and accompanying text. Among national and international policymakers, as well as
academics, international bankruptcy theory has become a prominent topic of discussion. The
subject has become mainstream. See, e.g., United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law, Working Group on Insolvency Law, Possible Future Work on Insolvency Law: Note by
the Secretariat, at 8, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.50 (1999)[hereinafter UNCITRAL Possible Future Work]; Board Receives Report on Russian Program; Structural Benchmarks
Remain to Be Met, IMF Survey, Vol. 28, No. 23, Dec. 13, 1999, at 389 [hereinafter Board
Receives Report on Russian Program]; IMF Staff, Recovery from the Asian Crisis and the
Role of the IMF, International Monetary Fund Issues Brief, June, 2000, at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/062300.htm [hereinafter Recovery from the Asian
Crisis].
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norms in international bankruptcy has been conspicuously absent from
the literature. But as Robert Rasmussen has noted, “[a]ny credible theory
of how transnational insolvencies should be handled has to wrestle with
27
the problem of comity between sovereign nations.”
This Article addresses the political feasibility question squarely. The
Article provides a game-theoretic framework for analyzing impediments
to universalist cooperation among sympathetic states. The gametheoretic approach to international cooperation has been a staple of modern international relations theory, applied to many traditional
28
international security and international economic issues. Applications
29
to international law, however, are fairly recent. The Article begins with
a summary in Part I of the debate over universalism and its claimed efficiencies. Part II suggests some intuitive reasons why states will be
reluctant to adopt universalism. Parts III and IV describe an even deeper
problem for universalism, arguing that even states interested in
universalist cooperation will have difficulty achieving it. Part III sets out
the universalist dilemma. Part IV describes the conditions of play in the
international bankruptcy game, showing their inhospitality
to
cooperation and the gloomy prospects for universalism. Part V contrasts
the universalist dilemma with international cooperation that occurs in
other contexts. It describes the role that international regimes and
institutions play in overcoming impediments to cooperation, while
expressing doubt that institutional solutions exist for universalism.

I. Debating Universalism
Territoriality simply honors the age-old behavior of nations in
exercising jurisdiction over assets and parties within their borders.
Analysts agree that territoriality is and has always been the dominant

27. Robert K. Rasmussen, Resolving Transnational Insolvencies Through Private Ordering, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2252, 2255 (2000) [hereinafter Rasmussen, Private Ordering].
All the participants in the debate over transnational insolvencies claim that their approach
is the most (economically) efficient. Indeed, to date, this is the primary claim of both the universalist and bankruptcy selection clause approaches, both of which have yet to even assert
that they respect the noneconomic decisions reflected in domestic bankruptcy law. Id. at 2256.
28. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
29. See Ronald A. Cass, Introduction: Economics and International Law, in Economic
Dimensions, supra note 11, at 1, 27 (“Until recently, there has been little game theoretic
analysis of international law issues, although game theory long has recognized nations as
strategic actors.”).
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practice.30 Each nation in which a multinational debtor owns assets
decides under its own laws how the assets within its territory should be
treated in the face of creditor claims. For example, assume that Firm A
has assets, employees, and creditors in both State A and State B. When it
suffers financial distress, it files for bankruptcy in State A, where its
headquarters are located. This will protect the firm’s assets in State A,
31
but under the territorial system that currently dominates, the filing will
have no effect on the firm’s assets in State B. Creditors may still pursue
32
the firm’s State B assets, relying on State B law. The firm might
additionally file for bankruptcy in State B, but that proceeding would
occur under State B law administered by State B courts.
Historically, analysts have also agreed that a universalist approach is
preferable to one segmented by territorial boundaries. The financial distress of a multinational firm should come under one bankruptcy regime,
even though several states may claim jurisdiction over various pieces of
the firm or over claimants located in or having some other connection
with those states.
This Part first explains the case for universalism, and then discusses
rival proposals that have recently emerged.
A. The Universalist Account
33

The basic universalist principle is “one law, one court.” As most
commonly envisioned by universalists, the courts of the debtor’s home
30. See LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 24, at 2220; Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Andrew T. Guzman, An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies, 42 J.
L. & Econ. 775, 787 (1999) (surveying laws of various jurisdictions and concluding that “the
dominant approach to transnational bankruptcies remains territorial”); Westbrook, Theory and
Pragmatism, supra note 24, at 460.
31. For a discussion of the few insolvency treaties that do exist, see Frederick Tung, Fear
of Commitment in International Bankruptcy, 33 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 555, 565 & n.42
(2001) [hereinafter Tung, Fear of Commitment].
32. The courts of State A might attempt to inhibit creditor collection activity against the
firm in State B, but the success of these efforts depends on the State A court’s ability to enforce its orders against particular creditors operating outside State A. See In re McLean Indus.,
Inc., 76 B.R. 291 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); 68 B.R. 690 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (illustrating
U.S. court’s attempt to enforce automatic stay against offshore collection activity).
33. Universalism comes in several flavors, at varying levels of abstraction. See Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law, supra note 8, at 514–18. See also LoPucki, Cooperation in
International Bankruptcy, supra note 25, at 704–32 (separately discussing “pure” and modified universalism).
At its most fanciful, universalism is imagined as a sort of one-world government system.
International bankruptcies would be governed by one international bankruptcy law administered by a unified system of international bankruptcy courts, thereby avoiding the messiness of
any local influence. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 8, at 2292. In a related con-

3/19/02 10:28 AM

TUNGTYPE.DOC

Fall 2001]

Is International Bankruptcy Possible?

11

country, applying home country bankruptcy law, would have worldwide
jurisdiction over the debtor’s bankruptcy. In Firm A’s bankruptcy, State A
34
would probably be the home country, and State A bankruptcy law
would govern Firm A’s bankruptcy worldwide. State A courts would enjoy global jurisdiction to administer State A bankruptcy law with respect
to the debtor’s assets and creditors everywhere, with other states deferring to State A courts. The home country courts would depend on local
35
courts in other states to carry out home country decisions.
Conceptually, universalism is attractive. A unified proceeding enables one court to administer the entirety of the debtor’s assets. This
maximizes the value that can be preserved for creditors by facilitating a
36
coordinated disposition of the debtor’s assets. It assures creditors’ equal
37
treatment, and it avoids the duplicative administrative costs that multi38
ple proceedings would entail. Standardizing home country law as the
governing law promotes predictability, thereby lowering the costs of
39
credit and facilitating economic activity. Universalists generally agree
that the home country should ordinarily be determined by the location of
40
the debtor’s principal place of business. They claim that this approach
should be straightforward in most cases, and that judges should be able
to handle the rare controversy that might arise.
Professor Jay Westbrook has been the leading advocate for
universalism. Recent scholarship by Professors Lucian Bebchuk and
Andrew Guzman has also identified other plausible efficiencies from
text, Professor Kal Raustiala has commented: “One central lesson to emerge from the history
of public international law is that international adjudication barely exists and rarely works.”
Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 Chi. J. Int’l L. 401, 408 (2000). Even
universalists admit that the proposed one-world system is implausible. See Westbrook, Global
Solution, supra note 8, at 2294.
34. Universalist advocates typically propose principal place of business as the proper determinant of the debtor’s home country. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
35. “[U]niversality has been commonly defined in terms of a primary proceeding in a
debtor’s ‘home’ or domiciliary country, with ‘ancillary’ proceedings in other jurisdictions
where the presence of assets or other matters require local assistance to the primary court.”
Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law, supra note 8, at 515. See also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
36. See Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 24, at 465.
37. Some creditors are typically more equal than others, however. See Westbrook, Choice
of Avoidance Law, supra note 8, at 508 (explaining role of priority rules in favoring some
classes of creditors over others).
38. See id., at 515; J.H. Dalhuisen, 1 Dalhuisen on International Insolvency and
Bankruptcy pt. 3, § 2.03[3], p. 3-186 (1986).
39. See Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 24, at 469.
40. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 8, at 2316; Guzman, In Defense of Universalism, supra note 21, at 2207.
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universalism. Bebchuk and Guzman argue that to the extent territoriality
is synonymous with discrimination against foreign creditors, it creates
inefficient investment incentives for debtors that would not plague a
41
universalist system. In a later piece, Guzman asserts that greater
predictability and lower information costs under universalism would
42
lower the costs of credit. Territoriality forces creditors continually to
monitor the location of the debtor’s assets and to ascertain the laws of
the various jurisdictions to which assets might possibly be moved.
Universalism, by contrast, makes asset location irrelevant, relieving
43
creditors of such burdens.
While universalist advocates have not focused much attention on the
question of how universalism might emerge, their brief comments suggest that universalism could evolve spontaneously through unilateral
reciprocity policies of individual states. By those lights, any state interested in universalism could unilaterally proclaim its willingness to
behave as a universalist toward any other state willing to adopt the same
44
reciprocity policy. In this way, universalist states would reveal themselves, presumably allowing emergence of a universalist system over
time.
B. Rival Proposals
Professors Lynn LoPucki and Robert Rasmussen have each questioned the claimed efficiency advantages of universalism, and each has
proposed a reform alternative.
In two recent articles, LoPucki has called for cooperation on a terri45
torial basis. Rather than overthrowing the existing territory-based order,
LoPucki would build on it. Under his system of cooperative territoriality,
41. See Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 30.
42. Guzman, In Defense of Universalism, supra note 21, at 2198.
43. See id. at 2199. Guzman also identifies various distortions in certain lending markets
that result from universalism and territoriality. See id. at 2190, 2202.
44. Jay Westbrook has proposed “common unilateralism,” a sort of unilateral universalism without treaties that would promote a culture of rough reciprocity among states. This
reciprocity would be facilitated by domestic institutions that would certify to their respective
judiciaries the various other states that qualify for deference based on rough similarity of their
laws and their reciprocity behavior. See Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 24, at
488. See also Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 30, at 804–06 (suggesting unilateral policy of
reciprocity). Westbrook has also mentioned the possibility of other more structured devices to
accomplish universalism, including piggybacking on the GATT or bilateral investment treaties. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 8, at 2296. I discuss universalism and
international institutions infra Part V.
45. See LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy, supra note 25; LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 24.
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each state would continue to exercise jurisdiction over, and apply its own
laws to, the debtor’s assets within its territory. Parallel bankruptcy proceedings could occur in each state with debtor assets, and cooperation
would occur through the interaction of agents appointed by each state to
46
represent the bankruptcy estate located there. States would negotiate
cooperative asset disposition on a case-by-case basis. Particular inefficiencies from territoriality could be remedied through specific
international arrangements, without attempting to impose an entirely
47
new regime on recalcitrant sovereigns.
Comparing the benefits of this system to universalism, LoPucki argues that universalism cannot deliver on its promise of ex ante
predictability or lower borrowing costs because the “home country” con48
49
cept is indeterminate and may be manipulated by debtors.
Furthermore, the interface between local nonbankruptcy law and universalist—foreign bankruptcy law would cause difficulties. The scope of
bankruptcy jurisdiction ceded to a universalist court would always be
open to question, and the dramatic shift from local nonbankruptcy entitlements to universalist bankruptcy entitlements would invite wasteful
50
gamesmanship by debtors and creditors. These interface issues are
51
much more manageable under a territorial system.
For his part, Robert Rasmussen has advocated a “debtor’s choice”
approach, under which each debtor’s corporate charter would specify a
choice of national bankruptcy law that would apply in case of financial
52
distress. The impetus to this approach is that the universalist choice of
home country law may not necessarily be the most efficient choice.

46. See LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 24, at 2219–20. These estate representatives could agree or not, presumably negotiating the fate of the debtor’s assets in the
shadow of the separate territorial outcomes that would occur absent cooperation. See id.
47. See LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy, supra note 25, at 761.
48. See LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 24at 2226. Problems with corporate groups may be especially intractable. See id. at 2229.
49. See id. at 2230. Universalists assert that determination of the home country will not
be difficult in most cases. See infra note 145. However, various standards—principal place of
business, state of incorporation, headquarters, center of main interests—have been used, with
no single standard having emerged. See LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy,
supra note 25, at 713–16 (discussing various tests).
50. See LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy, supra note 25, at 726–27. See
also discussion infra Part IV.A.
51. See LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 24, at 2237.
52. See Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19 Mich.
J. Int’l L. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Rasmussen, A New Approach]. See also Rasmussen, Private
Ordering, supra note 27.
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Instead, the argument goes, private parties allowed to choose their own
53
governing law would be better able to pick the optimal set of rules.
C. Is Universalism Possible?
LoPucki seems to agree with universalists that they offer a conceptually acceptable approach, and that as states’ various bankruptcy
regimes converge as a result of the globalization of business, universalism might emerge. However, LoPucki and Westbrook disagree about
how realistic is the hope for universalism. Westbrook seems to believe
that even piecemeal and sporadic deference to foreign insolvency proceedings is appropriate—despite the unpredictability and injustices
54
generated—as it moves us in the right direction toward universalism.
By contrast, LoPucki notes that harmonization sufficient to make universalism widely acceptable might take decades or even centuries. The
crucial question is “what to do while we are waiting for the ‘new world
55
society’—essentially, a world government—to arrive?”
I argue that the wait will be a long one. I agree with LoPucki’s conclusion that a new and improved territoriality is the right approach to
reform. However, I am even less optimistic than LoPucki that universalism is possible. At best, universalism is premature. At worst, it is futile.
Without directly addressing the efficiency debate among the competing
models, I am content to take universalists at their word, ignore universal56
ist critics, and assume the strongest case for universalism. I focus
instead on a prior question. Is universalism even possible as a political
matter? Only regularized universalist cooperation can deliver the predictability and promised efficiencies of universalism. I argue that such a
57
system is highly improbable.

53. See Rasmussen, A New Approach, supra note 52, at 5.
54. See Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 24, at 471 (approving instances
of judicial deference to foreign proceedings). I use the terms “bankruptcy” and “insolvency”
interchangeably.
55. LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 24, at 2217 (borrowing Jay Westbrook’s phrase).
56. See infra Part III.B. The improbability of universalism will ultimately affect the validity of efficiency claims by its proponents, however. See infra Part IV.D.
57. As will become clear from my discussion, this infeasibility that curses universalism
applies with equal or greater force to Robert Rasmussen’s debtor’s choice approach. I therefore focus my discussion on universalism.
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II. The Intuitive Implausibility of Universalism
States are generally reluctant to commit to universalism. In this Part,
I provide some intuitive reasons why. The next Part provides a more
formal game-theoretic framework to discuss this fear of commitment and
my doubts that universalism may provide a general solution for international bankruptcy cooperation.
Below I compare universalism with international recognition of civil
judgments, in order to illustrate the radical deference to foreign law and
foreign courts that universalism requires. I rely on existing international
arrangements in civil judgment recognition as a rough barometer to show
the limits of states’ cooperative inclinations with respect to conflicts of
laws. Bankruptcy is a particularly difficult area for international harmonization or cooperation. As I have discussed elsewhere in detail,
58
bankruptcy has drastic wholesale effects, and the deference to foreign
law and courts demanded by universalism is far greater than any commitment states have been willing to make to date. The observed limits of
nations’ willingness to commit to relatively narrow cooperation suggests
even greater reluctance to accede to the broader cooperative arrangement
demanded under universalism.
A conflict of laws arises when a legal dispute involves parties, property, or events that implicate more than one legal system. When a
multinational enterprise fails, various states may assert jurisdiction over
all or part of the failing firm or certain of its legal relationships. States
will seek to apply their own laws to those issues over which they claim
jurisdiction. Universalism simply provides a rule to resolve the conflicts
of laws that arise in this context.
In the typical bankruptcy context, the debtor will enter formal bankruptcy proceedings in its home country, whose courts will apply home
country bankruptcy laws. The home country court will attempt to include
the debtor’s foreign assets in the proceeding, claiming extraterritorial
jurisdiction over those assets and extending the effect of its bankruptcy
law to those assets. However, local courts in these other states will also
claim jurisdiction over assets within their respective territories. They will
seek to apply their own bankruptcy or other debt collection laws to those
assets, typically to the benefit of local creditors or other domestic inter59
est groups. Conflicts arise because states generally favor their own
58. See Tung, Fear of Commitment, supra note 31, (describing wholesale nature of bankruptcy proceedings and drastic effects of extraterritorial jurisdiction).
59. “[M]any countries remain focused on the risk of injury to local creditors, almost to
the preclusion of other considerations.” Jay L. Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency
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bankruptcy regimes—especially as to firms and assets within their territorial jurisdictions—and may attempt to extend extraterritorial effects to
include foreign assets of their domestic debtors. At the same time, states
will scrutinize and limit the local effects of foreign proceedings. They
will be leery of granting recognition and giving local effect to determina60
tions of foreign bankruptcy courts.
Universalism resolves this conflict by requiring the local court to defer to the home country court and its bankruptcy law. Universalism
demands that other states recognize and enforce home country court or61
ders applying home country bankruptcy law. However, states have
shown great reluctance to concede their sovereignty in favor of home
country law and courts.

Law, 70 Am. Bankr. L.J. 563, 571 (1996) [hereinafter Westbrook, Creating International
Insolvency Law] (reflecting on countries’ behavior in UNCITRAL Working Group on Transnational Insolvency, for which Professor Westbrook serves as co-leader of the U.S.
delegation). The benefits might not always be easy to limit to local creditors:
In the modern world, sophisticated multinational creditors are increasingly able to
claim in local proceedings all over the world. Thus it is fair to say that the primary
effect of the Grab Rule [territoriality] is to protect the primacy of local procedures
and local law, with local creditors and sophisticated multinationals sharing significant practical advantages as a result.
Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law, supra note 8, at 514.
60. “[O]ne may note the dual approach in many countries: own bankruptcies are generally favored and their effect extended abroad as far as possible, while the effects of foreign
bankruptcies are subjected to scrutiny and curtailment.” Dalhuisen, supra note 38, at pt. 3,
§ 2.02[3], p. 3–162.
A bankruptcy contractarian might argue that states should be indifferent as to whose
bankruptcy law applies, as long as the rule is clear so that debtors and creditors may properly
price credit and otherwise plan their affairs. It is clear, though, that states are not indifferent.
Each prefers that its regime of ex post loss distribution prevail. One plausible explanation may
be that ex post losses from international financial distress are vivid to domestic interest
groups, that in turn demand government intervention on their behalf. Or perhaps parochialism
is driven by bankruptcy professionals whose economic interest lies in maximizing the size of
the market for their local expertise. See infra note 93 and accompanying text. The ex ante
efficiency benefits from predictable rules, on the other hand, are both more diffuse and less
visible than the distribution of ex post losses.
61. See Dalhuisen, supra note 38, at pt. 3, § 2.03[2], p. 3–181. Recognition of judgments becomes an issue when one state has rendered a binding decision between private
parties, but the winning party must seek enforcement—e.g., collect against assets—outside the
territory of the rendering state. Both the winning party and the rendering state will be interested in seeing the judgment accorded respect in a state where the defendant’s assets may be
found. For a thoughtful discussion of international bankruptcy theory within a conflicts
framework, see Hannah L. Buxbaum, Rethinking International Insolvency: The Neglected
Role of Choice-of-Law Rules and Theory, 36 Stan. J. Int’l L. 23 (2000).
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Although international recognition of civil judgments is common
62
and becoming more so, universalist bankruptcy recognition is basically
nonexistent. Bankruptcy law is among the areas of law least amenable to
63
international harmonization or cooperation, and to date, the history of
64
multilateral insolvency cooperation has been marked by frustration.
A. Bankruptcy’s Wholesale Effects
Bankruptcy by its nature is a much more drastic type of legal proceeding than a simple civil suit between private parties. A garden variety
civil suit settles rights with respect to a particular transaction between
the parties, and a civil judgment is simply an order requiring the transfer
of money between private parties. Bankruptcy, by contrast, has wholesale effects. It provides for the comprehensive restructuring of a firm and
every legal relationship between the firm and its creditors and other in65
terested parties. Moreover, bankruptcy law is “meta-law.” In remaking
the firm, bankruptcy law overrides contract-, property-, and other legal
rights that exist outside of bankruptcy. While reordering prebankruptcy
rights, bankruptcy typically effects a blanket prejudgment attachment of
the debtor’s assets and a comprehensive stay of creditor collection attempts. Bankruptcy prioritizes creditor claims and scales down their
recoveries, effectively distributing the losses from the firm’s financial
distress over the entire body of creditors and other interested parties. In
this process, bankruptcy effectively renders judgment with respect to all
claims. It then executes these judgments through the bankruptcy distribution. The firm’s operations will typically be modified as well, or even
liquidated piecemeal. The proceeding will affect not only creditors,
62. See Russell J. Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws 707 (4th ed.
2001). Foreign tax judgments are a significant exception to this trend. See id. at 706. While the
details of states’ practices vary widely, many a state readily recognizes and enforces locally
the civil judgments rendered by courts of other states. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law, ch. 8 introductory note (1987) [hereinafter Restatement of Foreign Relations]. Numerous treaties on the subject exist. See id.; Eugene F. Scoles & Peter Hay,
Conflict of Laws § 24.38 (2d ed. 1992). See also infra note 78. Some states unilaterally
grant recognition without insisting on any explicit reciprocity arrangement with the rendering
state.
63. See Ian F. Fletcher, Commentary on Boshkoff, Some Gloomy Thoughts Concerning
Cross-border Insolvencies, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 943 (1994); Douglass G. Boshkoff, Some
Gloomy Thoughts Concerning Cross-Border Insolvencies, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 931 (1994).
64. See Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency Law, supra note 59, at 570 (noting
limited success of international bankruptcy conventions); Harold S. Burman, Harmonization
of International Bankruptcy Law: A United States Perspective, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 2543
(1996) (discussing failed efforts at international insolvency reform).
65. The phrase is Manfred Balz’s. See Manfred Balz, The European Union Convention
on Insolvency Proceedings, 70 Am. Bankr. L. J. 485, 486 (1996).
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equity holders, and employees, but also customers, suppliers, and taxing
66
authorities, among others.
With these wholesale effects, each state’s bankruptcy regime embodies its own myriad social policies. Each state has its favored creditors,
67
whose recoveries take priority over the general body of creditors. More
generally, states take differing approaches to resolving corporate financial distress and may have divergent views concerning the appropriate
68
goals and methods for a bankruptcy system. Each state naturally prefers
its own set of policy choices to those of other states. Especially with the
bankruptcy of a multinational firm, which is likely to involve assets and
liabilities of significant value, states may feel a significant stake in having their own laws apply, especially within their borders. A multinational
bankruptcy is likely to have widespread effects in the states in which the
firm does business or owns property. Because of these drastic effects and
significant social policy implications, states may understandably be re69
luctant to defer to foreign bankruptcy regimes. Each state will be
disinclined to recognize and give local effect to edicts of foreign courts
70
applying foreign bankruptcy law.
B. Bankruptcy Recognition and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Related to the broad social policy implications of recognizing foreign bankruptcy proceedings is the more technical problem of judicial

66. See Tung, Fear of Commitment, supra note 31, 565.
67. In the United States, grain producers and United States fishermen enjoy special priority over general creditors in certain cases. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(5) (1994). In South Korea,
Mexico, and France, employee priority claims are senior to secured claims. See Soogeun Oh,
Creditor Rights in Insolvency Procedure, Insolvency Systems in Asia: An Efficiency Perspective (OECD, Nov. 29–30, 1999), at http://www.oecd.org/daf/corporate-affairs/insolvency/inasia/oh.pdf(last visited August 26, 2000) (South Korea); American Law Institute, Transnational Insolvency Project: International Statement of Mexican Bankruptcy Law
71 (Tentative Draft Apr. 15, 1998) (Mexico); Wood, supra note 5, at 24 (France). By contrast,
in most countries, employee claims—almost invariably unsecured—are not excepted from the
general rule that secured claims have priority over unsecured claims with respect to the secured creditors’ collateral. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 5, at 24–25.
68. See Wood, supra note 5, at 7 (ranking various jurisdictions as debtor- or creditorfriendly based on various factors).
69. For example, in their negotiations over a cross-border insolvency convention, the
member states of the European Union were unwilling to abandon local priority rules. See infra
note 157 and accompanying text. The EU Insolvency Regulation that ultimately emerged
preserved territorial prerogatives to a great extent. See infra Part IV.B.1.
70. See Dalhuisen, supra note 38, pt. 3, § 2.03[2] p. 3–181. For further discussion of
states’ preference for their own law, see infra Part III.A.
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jurisdiction.71 While states vary in their requirements for recognition of
civil judgments, each invariably requires that the rendering court have
72
jurisdiction over the defendant-judgment debtor. The defendantjudgment debtor must have some sufficient connection with the forum
state to justify the court’s exercise of judicial power over her. In light of
this basic jurisdictional requirement, universalism represents a fairly
bold demand for foreign recognition. It asserts an aggressive jurisdictional reach that has no parallel outside the bankruptcy context.
Assertion of expanded judicial jurisdiction enables a state’s courts to
73
export social policy to other states. The jurisdictional test for recognition of foreign judgments can be understood as a mechanism to deter
74
such ambitions. Given the meta-law nature of bankruptcy, the potential
for export of social policy is great when a state asserts extraterritorial
bankruptcy jurisdiction. Potential importing states, understandably vigilant about such large scale imports, may reject universalism on that
basis.
To the extent local creditors’ rights are adversely affected by a foreign bankruptcy proceeding, their position is analogous to that of a
defendant-judgment debtor in ordinary civil litigation. Local creditors
71. In the U.S. lexicon, the issue is referred to as “personal jurisdiction.” In other systems, it is often dubbed “jurisdiction to adjudicate.”
72. See Restatement of Foreign Relations, supra note 62. See also Arthur T. von
Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, The Law of Multistate Problems 836 (1965) (“In
Anglo-American law . . . recognition of foreign judgments turns basically on the question
whether in the view of the recognizing court the rendering court had adjudicatory jurisdiction
in the international sense.”); Scoles & Hay, supra note 62, at 1011; Dalhuisen, supra note
38, at pt. 3, § 1.06[1], p. 3-70.2.
73. See LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy, supra note 25, at 759. The
export of social policy occurs when the rendering court applies its own laws to the dispute at
issue, as occurs under universalism. By choosing its own substantive law, the rendering court
asserts the prescriptive or legislative jurisdiction of its state. The court then exports its state’s
social policy through its expansive approach to judicial jurisdiction. See William S. Dodge,
Antitrust and the Draft Hague Judgments Convention, 32 L. & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 363, 365–66
(2001).
74. See Michael Whincop, The Recognition Scene: Game Theoretic Issues in the Recognition of Foreign Judgments, 23 Melb. U. L. Rev. 416, 425 (1999); Dalhuisen, supra note
38, pt. 3, § 1.02[1], p. 3–9. Efforts to expand jurisdiction may also appeal to the local bar,
which stands to gain in terms of increased representations as the scope of cases that may be
heard locally increases. See Whincop, supra at 424. Judgment recognition conventions and
municipal judgment recognition laws also typically allow for refusal of recognition if it would
be incompatible with the state’s public policy. See Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, adopted by the Special
Commission of the Hague Conference, art. 28(f), available at http://www.hcch.net/
e/conventions/draft36e.html (Oct. 30, 1999)[hereinafter Hague Convention]; Whincop, supra
at 428; Scoles & Hay, supra note 62, at 1014. This basis for refusal of recognition further
limits states’ social policy exporting ambitions.

3/19/02 10:28 AM

TUNGTYPE.DOC

20

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 23:1

would have enjoyed collection rights against the debtor’s local assets
under local law, absent a foreign party’s invocation of foreign legal process—in the form of the foreign bankruptcy proceeding—to alter local
creditors’ rights. Given that the entirety of local creditor dealings with
the debtor may have occurred locally, the adverse intervention of a foreign proceeding will trigger extraterritoriality concerns.
By way of comparison, consider the simple contract depicted in
Figure 1.
Figure 1
State A
National
Bank of A

State B

local
loan

Firm B

Assume the world consists of two states, State A and State B, represented by the two contiguous squares above. The large triangle
represents Firm B, a multinational firm whose home country is State B,
75
but which also has operations in State A. Suppose the National Bank of
A, a domestic bank in State A that lends only locally, has extended a
loan to Firm B. All aspects of the transaction were conducted in State A.
Under these conditions, absent the bank’s agreement otherwise, not only
would disputes relating to the loan ordinarily be resolved in the courts
and under the laws of State A, but any assertion of jurisdiction by courts
of State B would be highly contested. That Firm B may be incorporated
or headquartered or have its principal place of business or major operations in State B does not by itself confer on State B courts a
75. The orientation of the triangle and its location relative to the State A- State B border
are meant to suggest that Firm B’s “center of gravity”—however defined—is in State B, but
that Firm B also has nontrivial operations in State A. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Lessons of Maxwell Communication, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 2531, 2538 (1996) [hereinafter
Westbrook, Lessons of Maxwell] (discussing “center of gravity” of Maxwell bankruptcy).
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jurisdictional reach that is internationally recognized.76 The transaction at
issue has no other connection with State B. While State B might claim
such exorbitant jurisdiction for its courts, such an approach is typically
77
condemned by other states. Existing international conventions on jurisdiction and recognition of judgments forbid this exercise of jurisdiction
78
and forbid recognition of any judgment based on such jurisdiction. Yet,
this is exactly the deference that universalism demands, not just with
respect to specific transactions, but with respect to all the debtor’s affairs
79
in State A.
Consider next the general financial distress of Firm B. With the
debtor’s bankruptcy filing in State B, a universalist system would displace State A bankruptcy law with State B bankruptcy law. It would
disempower State A courts, requiring their deference to those of State B.
With its bankruptcy filing, the debtor would effectively drag not one but
all State A claimants into State B, even those with no connection to State
B whatsoever except having engaged with the debtor in a transaction
wholly within State A. The State B court would assert jurisdiction over
assets, parties, and legal relationships wholly within State A. Finally,
universalism would require State A to recognize and enforce decisions
rendered in the State B proceeding.
In effect, the rights of State A claimants, which would ordinarily include collection rights against debtor assets in State A adjudicated by
State A courts under State A law, would instead under universalism be
76. For example, the preliminary draft of the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments specifically forbids “the application of a rule of jurisdiction provided for
under the national law of a Contracting State . . . if there is no substantial connection between
that State and the dispute,” and more particularly forbids exercise of jurisdiction based solely
on “the domicile, habitual or temporary residence, or presence of the plaintiff” in a particular
State. Hague Convention, supra note 74, art. 18. The concept of “habitual residence” under
this convention is approximately the same as the home country concept under universalism.
See id. art. 3(2). See also Catherine Kessedjian, International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 39–40, available at ftp://hcch.net/doc/jdgm_pd7.doc
(revised translation October 1997)(noting as an exorbitant basis for jurisdiction “the domicile/habitual residence of the plaintiff”).
77. See Kurt H. Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora, in Conflict of Laws: International and Interstate 222 (1972) (describing controversy surrounding the
“notorious article 14 of the French Civil Code,” which bases jurisdiction on the plaintiff’s
French nationality).
78. See Hague Convention, supra note 74, art. 26; Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, July 28, 1990, art. 28, 29 I.L.M.
1413 (consolidating Brussels Convention of 1968 and the Protocol of 1971) [hereinafter Brussels & Lugano Conventions].
79. This is not to question that unified administration of an insolvency proceeding might
make economic sense, see supra Part I.A, but instead to point out the drastic assertion of
crossborder jurisdiction that this sort of approach requires.
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disaggregated from those local assets and subjected to foreign rules applied by a foreign court in light of foreign claims. Again, this
jurisdictional reach is uniquely a universalist aspiration. A similar assertion of jurisdiction made in the nonbankruptcy context—typically
involving a proceeding of more limited scope, concerning only one or a
few distinct transactions among a handful of private actors—would have
80
little hope of foreign recognition. In the basic civil judgment context,
the State B court would have no jurisdiction over the assets or creditors
in State A that had no contact with State B. The State B judgments
would therefore not merit recognition. The wholesale nature of bank81
ruptcy makes wholesale recognition even less appealing.
Bankruptcy law’s wholesale purview means that recognition of a
foreign proceeding effects the wholesale import of another state’s regime
for deciding sensitive policy issues. Political judgments about local asset
disposition and allocation of local losses from the foreign firm’s demise
are left in the hands of a foreign court. Universalism effectively requires
a state’s precommitment to wholesale deferral to other states’ various
82
prescriptions for financial distress. This is no small request.

III. The Game Theory of International
Bankruptcy Recognition
The preceding Part explained why states will generally be reluctant
to adopt universalism. States will be reluctant to precommit to recognizing other states’ assertions of extraterritorial bankruptcy jurisdiction.
This earlier discussion portends bleak prospects for universalism.
In the remainder of this Article, I consider universalism from a different perspective. Assuming for discussion purposes that states do or
may exist that prefer universalism to territoriality, I show that such states
will have difficulty implementing universalism. I rely on simple game
theory to show that even under the most optimistic circumstances (for a
80. Jurisdiction based on the nationality of the plaintiff—in the insolvency context, the
party instigating the foreign proceeding would be the appropriate analogue—is considered
“exorbitant.” Restatement of Foreign Relations, supra note 62, ch. 2 introductory note.
81. See Tung, Fear of Commitment, supra note 31, at 568.
82. Professor Westbrook suggests that these problems can be avoided by applying universalism only to “large” multinationals. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 8, at
2298. However, if the size of the firm bears any relation to the level of its local activity, it
would seem that a “large” firm would be at least as likely to engage in significant numbers of
local transactions—employment and supply contracts, for example—as a smaller multinational firm. The failure of the large multinational may have significantly greater local effects
than failure of a small one.
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universalist), universalism is unlikely to emerge.83 Whether universalist
deference to home country bankruptcy proceedings could be regularized
is doubtful. And given that predictability is one of the major promises of
84
universalism, regularity of cooperation is important to the universalist
agenda. Universalism is probably impossible, even among sympathetic
states.
My analysis proceeds as follows. In this Part, I frame universalism
as a prisoners’ dilemma and discuss prospects for solving the dilemma
under repeat play conditions, which are typical of international commercial interaction. In particular, I discuss simple reciprocity strategies
85
among states, an approach universalists seem to endorse. In the next
Part, I show that given the conditions of play in international bankruptcy,
simple reciprocity will not solve the universalist dilemma. Finally, in
Part V, I contrast the hopelessness of the universalist dilemma with observed cooperation that occurs in other contexts. I describe the role that
international regimes and institutions play in facilitating cooperation,
and I consider whether such mechanisms might aid universalism.
As prelude to this discussion, I first explain my focus on states as the
primary actors in the international bankruptcy game.

83. Game theory analysis is standard in international relations discourse. See Kenneth A.
Oye, Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies, 38 World Pol. 1
(1985); Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 Yale J. Int’l L. 335 (1989); Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International
Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship,
92 Am. J. Int’l L. 367 (1998); Duncan Snidal, Coordination versus Prisoners’ Dilemma:
Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 923 (1985)
[hereinafter Snidal, Coordination]; Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics,
38 World Pol. 25 (1985) [hereinafter Snidal, Game Theory]; Robert Axelrod & Robert O.
Keohane, Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions, in Cooperation
Under Anarchy 235 (Kenneth A. Oye ed., 1986). It has been applied in the conflict of laws
context. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws 182 (2d ed. 1995) (proposing game
models for choice of law analysis); William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-ofLaws Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 Harv. Int’l L.J. 101, 161 (1998)
(applying iterated prisoners’ dilemma model to choice of law); Larry Kramer, Return of the
Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 979, 1023 (1991); Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90
Colum. L. Rev. 277, 340–343 (1990) [hereinafter Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law]. This
resort to game-theoretical analysis has not been without controversy. See Stewart E. Sterk, The
Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 949, 1000 (1994) (doubting
that game theory prescriptions for achieving cooperative outcomes apply to judges’ choice of
law decisions); Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 Geo. L.J. 53, 55–56 (1991) (questioning
applicability of prisoners’ dilemma model to choice of law, and describing game theory and
choice of law as “Godzilla Meets the Swamp Thing”).
84. See, e.g., Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law, supra note 8, at 529 (noting that
benefits of universalism depend on “high predictability of results and reciprocity”).
85. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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A. States’ Interests and Preferences
Throughout my discussion, I implicitly engage certain simplifying
assumptions concerning states’ interests and preferences. I treat each
state as a unitary actor with well-defined interests and preferences. This
approach is familiar to international law and international relations dis86
course, and has been implicitly followed as well in the international
87
bankruptcy debate. In particular, I have argued that each state prefers its
88
own bankruptcy laws and policy choices to those of other states, without delving into the internal political dynamics that generate these
preferences.
This parochialism of states may seem unremarkable and without
need of further internal investigation. However, public choice and international relations theorists have cautioned us to be wary of treating states
89
as black boxes or billiard balls. Domestic politics matters for international policy, and unitary actor models of state behavior run the risk of
missing important domestic causal variables that affect international pol90
icy. Therefore, while I focus primarily on state actors—an approach I
86. See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the
World Political Economy 29 (1984); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of
Customary International Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1113, 1168 (1999) (defending simplifying
assumption that national leaders identify and pursue national self-interest); Abbott, supra note
83, at 351 (explaining simplifying assumptions to rational actor approach).
87. See supra Part I. The focus on state interests dominates choice-of-law scholarship.
“Most scholars now advocate, and courts now apply, some version of government interest
analysis, which looks to the states’ legislative interests in determining the applicable law.” Erin
A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1151, 1169 (2000).
88. See supra Part II.A. The general assumption that states’ favor their own laws is fairly
standard in the conflicts of law literature. See infra notes 108 and accompanying text (discussing states’ interests as embodied in their laws).
89. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games, 42 Int’l Org. 427, 433–35 (1988); Double-Edged Diplomacy: International
Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter DoubleEdged Diplomacy]; see generally, Jonathan R. Macey, Chicken Wars as Prisoners’ Dilemma:
What’s in a Game?, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 447 (1989) (reviewing John C. Conybeare,
Trade Wars: The Theory and Practice of International Commercial Rivalry (1987)
(noting importance of public choice analysis in understanding trade policy formation)); Colombatto & Macey, supra note 11 (denying that states have preferences or interests, and
arguing instead that only individuals have interests). See also O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note
87, at 1169 (criticizing traditional emphasis on government interests, as opposed to individual
interests, in U.S. conflicts scholarship and court opinions).
90. See Snidal, Coordination, supra note 83, at 926 (acknowledging drawbacks to realist
assumption of states as goal-seeking actors with well-defined preferences); Andrew Moravcsik, Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International
Bargaining, in Double-Edged Diplomacy supra note 89, at 3; Keisuke Iida, When and How
Do Domestic Constraints Matter?: Two-Level Games with Uncertainty, 37 J. Conflict Re-
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justify below—I first comment briefly on influences of domestic actors
91
and interest groups.
In general, a state’s preference for its own bankruptcy law and reluctance to recognize foreign bankruptcy proceedings may arise from the
desire of domestic political actors to defend the policies implicit in their
domestic laws. This may include the preservation of any perquisites that
redound to particular groups under those laws. The complexities of a
state’s bankruptcy regime reflect myriad policy decisions and political
92
trade offs. These trade-offs might enhance the public interest or merely
the interests of the victors in domestic rent seeking contests. Regardless
of which, political actors will wish to preserve the balance struck in their
93
domestic bankruptcy rules. They will generally resist recognition of
94
foreign bankruptcy proceedings that would upset this careful balance.
This home town bias sets the stage for the conflict of bankruptcy laws
that arises with the financial demise of a multinational firm.
For the remainder of this Article, I continue with the traditional
focus on state actors, assuming that their political leaders pursue national
interests, without much further attention to domestic politics. This
approach emphasizes external incentives and influences on states,
highlighting the systemic constraints and opportunities of the
sol. 403, 403–04 (1993) (criticizing realist tradition of “treat[ing] nation-states as unitary
actors” and noting that “[i]n reality, foreign policy decisions are the result of political processes within nation-states.”). Moreover, speaking of states’ interests and states’ preferences
may be anthropomorphic: “Institutions in general, and governments in particular, do not have
preferences, people do. Governmental policy reflects the preferences of powerful constituents,
not some mystically determined set of preferences that might be described as the ‘national
interest.’ ” Colombatto & Macey, supra note 11, at 931.
91. States’ internal political processes are heterogeneous, of course, so any account necessarily involves some generality and some speculation.
92. See supra Part II.A.
93. In general, interest groups with political influence sufficient to affect policy or capture rents from the domestic legislative process will typically also have sufficient influence to
preserve these policies or protect these same rents from potential dilution from the incursion
of foreign or international laws. Some evidence exists to suggest that bankruptcy professionals
exercise significant political influence in shaping a state’s bankruptcy law. See Bruce G. Carruthers & Terence C. Halliday, 74 Am. Bankr. L.J. 35, 38 (2000) (“Bankruptcy law
historically has appeared to be a marginal or complex field of law where most citizens or
companies have had little interest and where professional experience should count a great
deal.”); Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96
Mich. L. Rev. 47, 57 (1997) (describing lawyers’ roles and interests in shaping U.S. bankruptcy law reform); Stephan, supra note 17, at 787 (describing influence of technical experts
on formulation of international bankruptcy and commercial law). Reluctance to recognize
foreign bankruptcy proceedings might therefore arise from professionals’ desire to preserve
their local franchise in professional services from the foreign incursion that would result from
recognition.
94. I discuss the possibility of jurisdiction trading below. See infra Part III.B.
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international system.95 It makes the ensuing game analysis tractable; “it
96
simplifies our premises, making deductions clearer.”
Given that my task is to prove a negative, these simplifying assumptions only strengthen my argument. If, as I claim, states considered as
unitary actors will be unable to achieve cooperation, consideration of
domestic influences would only show universalism to be even more du97
bious. Opening the black box of the state only reveals more actors and
influences that might frustrate cooperative endeavors. In general, as the
98
number of relevant actors rises, cooperation becomes less likely. Identifying the domestic actors within each state only multiplies the number of
constituencies that must ratify, and may veto, any cooperative arrangement. “International agreement is less likely when domestic politics is
involved. . . . It is not just anarchy but also domestic politics that makes
99
cooperation difficult.” For the most part, I make fairly optimistic assumptions—from a universalist’s perspective—concerning states’
100
preference for universalism, in order to show its futility. Treating states
as unitary actors is consistent with this “best case” approach. Consideration of internal domestic influences would only make universalism less
likely, not more.
To that analysis we now turn.
B. Conflicting Bankruptcy Laws and the Prisoners’ Dilemma
Even between states that might prefer universalism to territoriality,
101
the states will find themselves in a prisoners’ dilemma. Below, I suggest a plausible account of states’ preference for universalism. Though
states generally prefer their own bankruptcy laws, I will assume that
states exist that identify a potential for mutual gains from universalist
cooperation—no small assumption, and one that is counterfactual for

95. See Keohane, supra note 86, at 29; Abbott, supra note 83, at 351–52.
96. Keohane, supra note 86, at 29. While two-level game analysis has been used to capture the interaction of international relations with domestic political constraints, the efforts
have been largely descriptive in nature. See, e.g., Double-Edged Diplomacy, supra note 89.
97. See Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic
Politics and International Relations 80 (1997).
98. See infra Part IV.D.
99. Milner, supra note 97, at 80. See also Albert Breton, Competitive Governments: An Economic Theory of Politics and Public Finance 269 (1996) (noting that
interests and preferences of citizens may impede government’s “freedom to tit (or to tat) when
it is time to do so.”).
100. See infra Part III.B.
101. For a description of this most famous of games, see Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation 7 (1984).
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many states.102 For clarity of exposition, I assume away any problems
relating to corporate groups, so that multinational enterprises are as103
sumed to have no subsidiaries, but own their foreign assets directly.
1. Conflicting Preferences and Cooperative Possibilities
Assume the world consists of our two states, A and B. Each state
must choose an international bankruptcy policy. Its two choices are universalism (“cooperation” in the game parlance) or territoriality
(“defection”). As previously discussed, State A will prefer that its bankruptcy law and bankruptcy jurisdiction extend to all situations in which
104
State A may have some plausible interest. In particular, State A will
prefer that jurisdictional competence for its bankruptcy regime include
the following:
(x)

bankruptcies involving State A firms,105 including the assets
of State A firms, whether located
(i) within State A
or

102. See supra Part II. Jay Westbrook has also noted the difficulties of achieving universalism, enumerating certain preconditions to its realization. My assumption of mutual
cooperative gain parallels his assertion for the necessity for “critical-mass reciprocity,” basically that enough states exist that share the perception of mutual gains from universalist
cooperation that they will participate in reciprocal arrangements. See Westbrook, Theory and
Pragmatism, supra note 24, at 467. He further asserts that roughly similar bankruptcy laws are
required. See id. at 468. However, this condition may neither be necessary nor sufficient. Even
“identical” bankruptcy laws would not necessarily cause states to be indifferent as to whose
law and courts control particular assets. Given that (a) most states refuse to recognize the tax
claims of other states while giving priority to their own tax claims, and (b) professional fees—
possibly of sizable amounts—are always at stake, each state would still have some incentive to
refuse deference and instead assert its territorial privilege. On the other hand, Westbrook is
correct that the more similar are states’ bankruptcy laws, the smaller is the immediate cost of
cooperation in a particular case.
103. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. If cooperation cannot be achieved in the
simple case, it will be even more unlikely given added complexity. See, e.g., LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 24, at 2230 (describing easy manipulation of universalist
home country standard in context of corporate groups).
104. See supra Part II.A. This coincidence of choice of law and forum is consistent with
the universalist approach, which also selects the home country court as the appropriate forum.
Once home country law is chosen, this forum selection generally makes sense, since home
country courts will be the most able at applying that law. See Rasmussen, A New Approach,
supra note 52, at 33–34 (“Bankruptcy rules are notoriously complex. It is fanciful to expect a
court to apply the bankruptcy law of a foreign country with anything approaching an acceptable degree of accuracy. Thus, for pragmatic reasons, a forum should generally apply its own
bankruptcy law.”).
105. That is, firms with home country A.
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(ii) outside the territory of State A;106 and
(y)

all other assets located in State A that become involved in
bankruptcy proceedings,107 regardless of their ownership, i.e.,
including assets owned by State B firms.

State B will have similar preferences.
Of course, it is not possible for all of both states’ preferences to be
fulfilled all the time. Figure 2 illustrates the conflicting preferences.
Figure 2
State A

State B
(x)(ii)A → ∼ (y)B

Firm A
Firm B
(x)(ii)B → ∼ (y)A

Firm A is a State A firm; Firm B is a State B firm. The shaded areas
of Firm A and Firm B identify the international operations of each firm.
It is these offshore assets that trigger international bankruptcy issues
when a firm suffers financial distress. Competing assertions of bankruptcy jurisdiction will focus on these offshore assets.
State A’s desire to apply its bankruptcy law to assets owned by State
A firms but located in State B will clash with State B’s desire to have its
bankruptcy law apply to all assets located in State B. In general, fulfillment of preference (x)(ii) of either state will require the other state’s
106. See supra note 60 and accompanying text; Wood, supra note 5, at 240 (describing
extraterritorial reach of various bankruptcy regimes). Under U.S. law, for example, the bankruptcy estate created upon the commencement of the proceeding includes property of the
debtor “wherever located.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1994).
107. I borrow Lynn LoPucki’s definition of “located” to include not only physical location of tangible assets, but to encompass intangible assets as to which a state is able
unilaterally to enforce its determinations. See LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy, supra note 25, at 743 and n.228. Under this definition, of course, an intangible asset
could theoretically be located simultaneously in both State A and State B. I ignore that wrinkle
for present purposes.
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relinquishment of its preference (y) and recognition of the first state’s
assertion of extraterritorial bankruptcy jurisdiction. This of course is
universalism. With territoriality, on the other hand, a state will insist on
its preference (y) in the face of the other state’s assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction and its preference (x)(ii).
This sort of competition among states to advance their own laws and
policies is not necessarily a zero-sum game. One state’s gain in having
its laws applied to a given dispute does not necessarily diminish a com108
peting state by the same amount. In many disputes, one state will have
a greater stake in application of its own law than will other states. One
state will more highly “value” application of its law than others. If states
could cooperate by deferring to each other’s laws on this welfare maximizing basis, then as a group they could make themselves better off than
109
if each state blindly applied its own law whenever it could.
The presumptive welfare maximizing choice of law implicit in the
universalist approach, of course, is the law of the debtor’s home country.
Universalists have not explicitly defended home country law on this ba110
sis, but for purposes of my discussion, I assume this choice is
plausible. The home country in many cases will have the greatest interest
111
in having its law govern its debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding.
108. For our purposes, we may assume a state “gains” when its policies are furthered by
the application of its laws. See Brilmayer, supra note 83, at 193; Joel P. Trachtman, Externalities and Extraterritoriality: The Law and Economics of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, in
Economic Dimensions, supra note 11, at 642 (analogizing prescriptive jurisdiction to property rights and discussing jurisdictional trade). In addition, we may assume that a state’s gains
inure to the benefit of domestic interest groups that supported the original domestic legislative
bargain, and therefore that such groups will support such jurisdictional trades.
109. See Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, supra note 83, at 340; Brilmayer, supra
note 83, at 197; Trachtman, supra note 108, at 645.
110. Neither predictability nor the desire for one main forum necessarily requires application of home country law. Predictability only depends on a clear choice of law rule, not that
the choice be home country law. For instance, a rule that U.S. bankruptcy law (or the bankruptcy law of any other specified jurisdiction) should apply to all crossborder bankruptcies in
the world offers better predictability than a home country rule. On the other hand, a desire for
one main forum may suggest that whatever forum is selected ought to apply the law it applies
best—its own domestic law. See supra note 104.
111. Moreover, one can imagine domestic interest group alignments that might coalesce
around a universalist policy. Given the absence of any universalist arrangements in the world,
scant evidence exists on this question. However, it appears that bankruptcy professionals typically play important roles in promoting bankruptcy reform, both domestically and
internationally. See supra note 93. Recent international bankruptcy reform efforts have been
driven largely by reform-minded lawyers and legal academics acting primarily through “private” legislatures, that is, technical expert groups affiliated with professional organizations or
selected by international organizations. See Stephan, supra note 17 (discussing private legislatures and role of technical experts in drafting UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvencies); Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency Law, supra note 59 (discussing
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2. The Universalist Dilemma
Assuming that each state values mutual cooperation more than mutual defection, these conditions produce a prisoners’ dilemma. I begin
with a general description of the dilemma in normal form to illustrate
states’ incentives under single-play conditions. In the next section, I consider the more realistic scenario of repeated interaction.112
Returning to our two-state example, with two policy choices available to each state, there are four possible combinations of their
decisions. For each state, we can rank these four possible outcomes in
relative order of desirability, with 4 being a state’s most favored outcome
various reform initiatives). Consistent with this evidence, bankruptcy professionals would
likely play a leading role in a given state’s adoption of universalism. A state’s lawyers and
other bankruptcy professionals would presumably prefer universalism if they believed that
they would realize a net gain in retentions and fees as compared to territoriality.
Assuming bankruptcy professionals’ expertise remains territorially bound, local professionals would favor universalism if they anticipated that they would be exporting their
bankruptcy expertise more often than they would be witnessing foreign professional imports.
That is, a state’s bankruptcy professionals would support universalism if they believed their
home jurisdiction would be the home country more often than not. They would lose some
revenues, of course, in those cases in which a foreign bankruptcy regime controlled. Issues
affecting local assets and legal relationships, which would have been litigated, negotiated, and
decided locally under a territorial regime, would instead be subject to the foreign court’s home
country jurisdiction, where foreign professionals would reap the lion’s share of fees. On the
other hand, local professionals would stand to gain from the cases in which their state was the
home country. Those cases would offer local professionals the chance to export their local
expertise as home country bankruptcy specialists, advising foreign as well as local parties as
to how the state’s bankruptcy regime would operate. Consistent with this proposition, Lynn
LoPucki has observed that “American bankruptcy professionals are nearly all universalists,
because they assume the reorganizations will all come to the US so [the debtors] can be debtors in possession. Canadian bankruptcy professionals are (mostly closet) territorialists because
they make the same assumption.” See e-mail from Prof. Lynn LoPucki, Security Pacific Bank
Professor of Law, UCLA Law School, to author (Feb. 24, 2001) (on file with author).
Of course, a given state’s bankruptcy professionals may not hold uniform preferences on
the subject of universalism. Those on the losing end of universalism may not be the same as
those on the winning end. For example, professionals accustomed to representing unsophisticated local creditors with no offshore lending activities would only stand to lose business
under universalism. Professionals representing unsophisticated clients may also not enjoy the
same political influence as professionals with sophisticated international firms or lenders for
clients. Therefore, the politics of universalism may turn disproportionately on the interests of
the elite bankruptcy professionals in each state.
112. In the repeat play of international bankruptcy cooperation, we can think of each
state’s separate decisions on cooperation or defection as “moves” in the prisoners’ dilemma
game. In this context, the moves will ordinarily be sequential, rather than simultaneous: when
State A is put to the choice of cooperation or defection, it will already have observed State B’s
earlier strategy choices when State A was the home country requesting State B’s cooperation.
Whether players move sequentially or simultaneously, or which player moves first in the sequential game, does not affect the equilibrium of the prisoners’ dilemma game. See Jack
Hirshleifer & David Hirshleifer, Price Theory and Applications 287 (6th ed. 1998).
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and 1 being the least favored. In State A’s best scenario—its most highly
ranked outcome of—all its preferences are met. It chooses territoriality,
while State B chooses universalism. Under this outcome, State B will
defer to State A’s assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction when a State A
insolvency proceeding involves Firm A operations or assets in State B
(State A’s preference (x)(ii) above), and State A will not defer to State B
when the roles are reversed, but will apply its own law (State A’s preference (y) above). State A will enjoy the fruits of State B’s deference
without having to reciprocate. In game theory parlance, State A will wish
to defect, while having State B cooperate.
Next best from State A’s perspective is mutual cooperation. By hypothesis, mutual cooperation is superior to mutual defection for State A,
so State A is willing to defer when State B is the home country, provided
State B reciprocates, i.e., State B defers when State A is the home country. While this outcome does not satisfy all of State A’s preferences, it
does garner State A the benefits of mutual cooperation. We give this outcome a ranking of 3.
After mutual cooperation comes mutual defection, which we can
rank at 2. And finally, State A’s worst outcome occurs when it cooperates
but State B fails to reciprocate. In this scenario, State A defers to State
B’s assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction when State B is the home
country, but State B does not accord the same deference to State A’s assertions of home country extraterritorial jurisdiction in State B. So
neither State A’s preference (x)(ii) nor its preference (y) is satisfied. This
outcome ranks the lowest at 1.
State A’s rank ordering of preferred outcomes, then, is as follows:
4

State A defects (chooses territoriality);
State B cooperates (chooses universalism).

3

State A cooperates; State B also cooperates.

2

State A defects; State B also defects.

1

State A cooperates; State B defects.113

113. I do not claim that these preferences and payoffs hold for all states. If anything,
many states’ preferences are likely to be more rivalrous than those found in the prisoners’
dilemma. Symmetric or asymmetric deadlock may apply, making universalist cooperation
even more hopeless. See Oye, supra note 83, at 7 (“When you hear hoof beats, think horse
before you think zebra. . . . When you observe conflict, think Deadlock—the absence of mutual interest—before puzzling over why a mutual interest was not realized.” (internal
quotations omitted)); Abbott, supra note 83, at 357 (describing deadlock games).
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Assuming State B has similar preferences, their respective preference orderings and strategic incentives are reflected in the 2x2 matrix in
114
Figure 3.
Figure 3

State A

Cooperate
(universalism)

Defect
(territoriality)

Cooperate
(universalism)

3,3

1,4

Defect
(territoriality)

4,1

2,2

Several features of their interaction are noteworthy. State A’s best
outcome also represents State B’s worst outcome, since State B has garnered the costs but not the benefits of interacting with State A. This
explains the (4, 1) rankings in the southwest box of Figure 3. Because
the two states’ preferences are symmetrical, when their policy choices
are reversed, their respective rankings of that outcome are reversed as

For example, besides states’ general concerns regarding recognition described supra Part
II, particular asymmetries among states may make universalism especially unappealing to
some states. Less developed countries (LDCs), which typically import far more direct investment than they export, would see little benefit from universalism. LDCs would find
themselves far more often deferring to industrial country bankruptcy regimes, rather than
seeing their own domestic regimes applied extraterritorially. Since far more multinational
firms are headquartered in industrial countries, those countries—and not LDCs—would more
often be the home country for multinational bankruptcies. See Tung, Fear of Commitment,
supra note 31, at 576–77. Some states may also find themselves consistently “asset-heavy.”
Multinational debtors’ assets will be disproportionately distributed across jurisdictions relative
to the amounts of local creditors’ claims in each jurisdiction. Some states may find themselves
consistently in relative surplus. Such states may therefore prefer territoriality since that maximizes the amount of assets subject to distribution under the local regime. See Tung, Fear of
Commitment, supra note 31, at 577. Transfer payments or issue linkage might be helpful in
persuading these territorialist regimes to adopt universalism, but there appears to be no political impetus to pursuing such approaches, and universalists have not advocated them. See infra
Part V.B.
In any event, the prisoners’ dilemma model seems appropriate among countries with significant commercial relations and for whom mutual advantage from universalist cooperation
would seem to exist. Moreover, universalist advocates implicitly assume these preferences in
their advocacy. See infra note 118.
114. State A’s ranking of each outcome is the first number of the pair, while State B’s
ranking is the second number.

3/19/02 10:28 AM

TUNGTYPE.DOC

Fall 2001]

Is International Bankruptcy Possible?

33

well, giving us the (1, 4) outcome in the northeast box.115 In addition, as
discussed above, both states are better off if they both cooperate—
garnering the (3, 3) result in the northwest box—than if neither do. Mu116
tual defection leaves them the (2, 2) result in the southeast box.
Each state prefers mutual universalist cooperation to mutual territoriality, but they have a problem. They will not achieve mutual
cooperation. Instead, they will each choose to defect, even though they
both know this to be a suboptimal outcome. This is the prisoners’ dilemma. Consider the possible scenarios from State A’s perspective. With
no ability to assure State B’s cooperation (an issue I discuss below) State
A is always better off defecting. If State B cooperates, then State A obtains its best payoff by defecting. If State B instead defects, State A is
also better off defecting. Otherwise, State A ends up with the “sucker’s
payoff,” its worst result in the game. State B is in a similar predicament
and must also defect. For both states, defection is the dominant strategy—each state’s best strategy no matter what choice the other state
117
makes. The dilemma is that individually rational strategy choices of
the two states result in mutual defection, which for both states is an infe118
rior outcome compared to mutual cooperation.
In the international context, the dilemma arises because states’
promises may not be credible. Among sovereign states, no ultimate
international authority exists to enforce states’ promises. No
115. If we represent the combination of the players’ two strategies as an ordered pair,
with a player’s strategy as the first element and her counterpart’s as the second, then each
player’s best outcome is DC—she defects while the other player cooperates. Conversely, each
player’s worst outcome is CD.
116. For each player, CC > DD. Combining this preference with those described above
gives the overall ordering of player preferences: DC > CC > DD > CD. This is the general
definition of the single-play prisoners’ dilemma. A further condition that CC > (DC + CD)/2 is
required in order to assure the possibility of mutual cooperative benefits from iteration, which
is discussed infra in Part III.C. This separate condition assures that consistent mutual cooperation returns higher payoffs than if the players merely took turns defecting.
117. See Douglas G. Baird et al., Game Theory and the Law 11 (1994) (explaining dominant strategy).
118. That is, DD is not Pareto-efficient. Consistent with this account, universalist advocates, bemoaning the failure of international efforts at cooperation, promise mutual benefits if
only states could forswear pursuit of short-term parochial interests in particular cases. Universalists seem to recognize that not all states are ready for cooperation. See supra note 102 and
accompanying text. However, for those that stand to benefit from mutual cooperation, a prisoners’ dilemma exists that can hopefully be overcome. See Westbrook, Theory and
Pragmatism, supra note 24, at 466; Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law, supra note 8, at 518
(describing cooperative benefits); Lore Unt, International Relations and International Insolvency Cooperation: Liberalism, Institutionalism, and Transnational Legal Dialogue, 28 Law
& Pol’y Int’l Bus. 1037, 1046 (1997). See also Stephan, supra note 17, at 785 (viewing
international insolvency as “a classic collective action problem”).
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supranational sovereign exists to force states to abide by their
commitments. Without such a central authority, states cannot guarantee
future performance of their promises. “Nations dwell in perpetual
anarchy, for no central authority imposes limits on the pursuit of
119
sovereign interests.” Even if mutual cooperation is preferable to mutual
defection, states will have difficulty making credible their promises to
cooperate.
One might suppose that a treaty provides a straightforward solution
to this problem of credible commitments. Enforcement of promises can
solve even the one-round prisoners’ dilemma. However, a treaty does not
create its own coercive enforcement authority. It has no independent
binding effect. That states often comply with treaty obligations does not
necessarily suggest any binding effect. Instead, a state’s behavior consistent with its treaty obligations may show only that any benefit from
breaching is outweighed by the possible retaliation of its treaty part120
ners. As the costs and benefits associated with compliance and
121
cheating vary, so does the likelihood of compliance.
Perhaps states could back up their universalist treaty commitments
with domestic legislation instructing their courts as to application of the
appropriate universalist conflicts of law rules. Domestic legislation mandating judicial implementation of universalism might provide some
assurance to treaty partners about a state’s future cooperation. Presumably, such enabling legislation could only be changed with some
difficulty. Its passage might therefore add credibility to a state’s universalist commitment.
However, demonstrating precommitment to universalism in this way
122
will be problematic. As more fully discussed below, specifying the
119. Oye, supra note 83, at 1.
120. See Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 86, at 1171.
121. This is not to assume away any reputational consequences that may attach to treaty
violations. But these are simply additional costs in each state’s decisional calculus. Moreover,
reputational effects are ambiguous. A reputation for honoring international commitments must
compete with other reputational interests states might have. A reputation for helping one’s
allies or punishing one’s enemies, or a reputation for toughness, for example, might be as or
more useful to a state in achieving its international objectives. These various reputational interests may conflict in any given case. Reputation may also not be as critical for powerful
states, which may be “the only game in town” with respect to particular issues or transactions.
See Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 Harv.
Int’l L.J. 487, 497–98 (1997). Even assuming a reputation for honoring international commitments were paramount, negative reputational consequences depend on third parties being
able to distinguish cooperation from defection, which will not be easy in the context of universalism. See infra Part IV.B.
122. See infra Part IV.A–B.
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universalist commitment with particularity will be difficult, whether in a
treaty or in any enabling domestic legislation. Choice of law rules are
123
124
notoriously imprecise and indeterminate, as universalists admit. The
universalist commitment will inevitably be expressed in terms of imprecise standards, relying on the exercise of ex post judicial discretion for
their application. But standards and ex post discretion—as opposed to
hard-and-fast rules—do not deliver a credible commitment. Instead, they
offer only ambiguity concerning the content of any ostensible commitment, and they invite both cheating and good faith disagreement over
125
their proper implementation. Universalist commitments will be fuzzy.
But fuzzy commitments implemented through judicial discretion will not
be credible commitments, so states will be reluctant to make such com126
mitments in the first place.
C. Repeat Play and Conditions for Cooperation
Happily, states considering cross-border bankruptcy cooperation
may anticipate repeat interaction with one another. In this repeat play
context, states may have more sophisticated policy options than the
once-and-for-all decision either to cooperate or defect. Each state may
adopt a conditional strategy, which takes account of the other state’s past
behavior in deciding its own moves. In this context, the prospects for
reaching cooperative outcomes under the prisoners’ dilemma improve
127
considerably. Each player has the ability to reward or punish the
123. See Whincop, supra note 74, at 427–28 (identifying indeterminacy of choice of law
rules as reason for absence of choice of law requirement for judgment recognition).
124. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
125. Whincop, supra note 74, at 433. As Whincop suggests:
[W]here jurisdiction is defined by standards rather than rules, no credible commitment is made because the content of the standard is only ascertained at the time that
the standard is applied to the case. That is inherent in the definition of a standard.
Since no commitment has been made other than to apply a standard, courts will
have an opportunity to cheat when cases arise, especially when the matters on
which a court purports to base its judgment . . . are difficult for other states to observe or verify.
Id. See generally Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. Legal Stud. 271, 279–80 (1992) (discussing
difficulties of contracting conditioned on information that is unobservable or unverifiable).
126. “[P]arties will not contract on the basis of unverifiable terms. This should apply
equally to conventions.” Michael J. Whincop & Mary Keyes, Policy and Pragmatism in
the Conflict of Laws 159 (2000). This may in part explain why universalism has nowhere
been implemented, despite its attraction to commentators.
127. See Oye, supra note 83; Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 83, at 235. See generally
Axelrod, supra note 101 (describing experiments confirming evolution of cooperation with
repeat-play prisoners’ dilemma games).
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other—augment or reduce the other’s payoff—by cooperating or defect128
ing in any given round of play. Each player also understands that it
may be punished in later rounds for defection in the current round. Given
the prospect of reward for mutual cooperation and future punishment for
current defection, a stable pattern of reciprocal cooperation can
129
emerge. If the game is infinitely repeated, or players do not know when
the last round of play will occur, as is typically the case with interna130
tional commercial relations, stable cooperation is possible.
One could also imagine particular rounds of the international bankruptcy game in which
the payoffs might not correspond to the prisoners’ dilemma, but might be more conducive to
cooperation. For instance, suppose that State U, a universalist regime, is the home country for
Firm U’s bankruptcy, but that significant Firm U assets are located in State T, a territorial
regime. Suppose further that in the particular case, (a) claims of State T creditors are predominantly local employee claims, which do not enjoy priority under State T bankruptcy law, but
would enjoy high priority under the bankruptcy laws of State U; (b) State U creditors are primarily banks, which enjoy no priority under the laws of either state; (c) there are no other
significant creditor groups; and (d) neither state’s bankruptcy laws discriminate against foreign creditors. If State T acted territorially, rejecting the jurisdiction of the State U universalist
court and applying its own bankruptcy laws to Firm T’s local assets, it would have to distribute
the value of those assets pro rata as among State U bank creditors and State T employee creditors. On the other hand, because State T’s employee creditors would enjoy priority in the
universalist proceeding, relinquishing local assets to the universalist proceeding would enable
State T’s creditors to recover against those assets before State U’s bank creditors. In that situation, the clear benefit to State T creditors from State T’s universalist cooperation would likely
outweigh any countervailing policy considerations that might argue for territoriality by State
T.
While particular cases might arise in which states’ preferences are less rivalrous than in
the prisoners’ dilemma, they are not likely to arise regularly, as my stylized facts above suggest.
128. In fact, each player’s payoff is affected more by the other player’s move than its
own. Each player’s move affects its own payoff by only one ordinal ranking, but the other
player’s move affects the first player’s payoff by two ordinal rankings. See Snidal, Coordination, supra note 83, at 927.
129. In Robert Axelrod’s cooperation experiments, he found that a Tit for Tat strategy
was the overall best performing strategy in computer simulations of round-robin repeat prisoners’ dilemma tournaments. With that strategy, a player starts out cooperating, and then in
every subsequent round simply plays the strategy that the other player played in the prior
round. So every instance of cooperation from Player B is rewarded with cooperation from
Player A, and every defection is punished by a retaliatory defection in the next round. See
Axelrod, supra note 101, at 31. Tit for Tat, however, performs less well in “noisy” environments, where imperfect monitoring or other errors may undercut simple reciprocal strategies
for cooperation. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
130. See Oye, supra note 83, at 13 & n.25. While backwards induction predicts that for
finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma games, cooperation will not evolve, see Axelrod, supra
note 101, at 10, finite repetition is typically not an issue in international relations. See Oye,
supra note 83, at 13 n.25. In addition, experimental evidence shows that even in the finite
game, players cooperate up until the last few rounds. This divergence between predicted and
observed results may be reconciled by relaxing the assumption of common knowledge of
rationality. See Barry Nalebuff, Prisoners’ Dilemma, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of
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Whether cooperation in fact emerges depends on the “shadow of the
future,” the particular contours of the anticipated future interaction between the players. In any given round, cooperation requires each player
to forego its single—play dominant strategy move—defection—in the
hope of garnering the future benefits of the other player’s cooperation.
Therefore, the rational player will weigh the immediate benefits of current defection against anticipated future payoffs from current
cooperation. In the context of universalism, a non-home country asked to
defer to home country insolvency proceedings must decide whether immediate gains from defection—exercising territorial jurisdiction and
applying its own laws to particular issues—outweigh the prospect of future cooperative payoffs—enjoying extraterritorial jurisdiction and
application of its own bankruptcy laws beyond its borders when it later
finds itself as the home country.
Several factors are critical to this strategy choice and the shadow of
the future generally. First, perceived durability of a relationship and anticipated frequency of interaction will improve a state’s willingness to
131
cooperate. With commercial relations, states can typically anticipate
132
that their relationships with other states will continue indefinitely. This
perception of a long time horizon means a long future from which cooperative rewards may potentially emerge. Anticipated frequent interaction
also assures each player of regular opportunities to garner cooperative
future payoffs or if necessary, to punish defection with swift retaliation.
If significant cross-border direct investment exists or is anticipated between States A and B, and investment flows are not too lopsided in one
direction, then the two states may anticipate that the game of crossborder bankruptcy cooperation will have many future iterations. Each
state anticipates that it will find itself in the position of both home country and non-home country in the future. As the latter, it will understand
that in any given round, its decision whether to play universalism or territoriality will affect its future payoffs. On the other hand, if States A and
Economics and the Law 92 (1998). Common knowledge of rationality means that all the
players know that all the players are rational, all the players know that all the players know
that all the players are rational, and so on. See Roger B. Myerson, Game Theory: Analysis
of Conflict 64 (1991). Common knowledge is a very strong informational assumption. For a
discussion of its subtleties, see Peter H. Huang, Still Preying on Strategic Reputation Models
of Predation, 3 Green Bag 437, 439 (2000) (reviewing John R. Lott, Jr., Are Predatory
Commitments Credible? Who Should the Courts Believe? (1999)).
131. See Axelrod, supra note 101, at 129.
132. By contrast, in security affairs, a particular act of defection may be decisive in crippling or destroying another player, thereby eliminating the possibility of retaliation. See
Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 83, at 232–33.
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B do not anticipate significant future interaction, then the international
bankruptcy cooperation game looks very much like a one-shot game, for
which defection is the dominant strategy.
Related to a state’s time horizon is its discount factor—how it values
future payoffs as compared to immediate payoffs. Players are typically
impatient. All other things being equal, they prefer an immediate payoff
to an identical payoff in the future. The discount factor captures just how
much a state discounts a future payoff as compared to an immediate
133
one. The lower the discount factor, the less a state values the future
payoff as compared to the immediate payoff. In the context of the prisoners’ dilemma, a low discount factor spells more ready defection than
cooperation. Cooperation demands delayed gratification, but the lower
the discount factor, the more attractive is the immediate payoff from defection. Therefore, in order for cooperation to emerge, states must have
sufficiently high discount factors to induce them to forego immediate
defection payoffs in favor of future cooperative payoffs. Finally, with
repeat play and the weighing of immediate versus future gains, payoff
structure matters. In particular, interval levels of the various payoffs, and
not just their rank ordering, are important to consider. For example, the
difference between the unilateral defection payoff and the mutual coop134
erative payoff matters. The smaller this is, the lower is the temptation
135
to defect, since the relative gain from defection is small. In general,
136
relatively higher cooperative payoffs and relatively lower defection
137
138
payoffs make cooperation more likely.
133. The discount factor δ falls between 0 and 1. With money payoffs, if r is the prevailing interest rate, then δ = 1/ (1+r). The present value of a payoff of π dollars is equal to δπ if
paid in the next period. See Robert Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economists 68 &
n.7 (1992). Other payoffs can be similarly discounted. See James D. Morrow, Game Theory
for Political Scientists 38 (1994). The discount factor may also incorporate the possibility
that a game will end. The end of the game means no further prospect for future cooperative
payoffs. So a higher probability of the game’s end generally means that a state will value immediate payoffs more highly, making defection more attractive. See Gibbons, supra, at 90.
134. That is, DC–CC. See supra notes 115–116.
135. See Abbott, supra note 83, at 364 (describing devices by which player reduces its
own defection payoff in order to facilitate cooperation).
136. Namely, CC and CD.
137. That is, DC and DD.
138. See Axelrod, supra note 101, at 134 n.3; Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the
Security Dilemma, 30 World Pol. 167, 171 (1978). The discount factor δ can be expressed in
terms of these payoffs to specify the conditions under which reciprocal strategies will form
cooperative equilibria. For instance, two players playing Tit for Tat strategies will reach a
cooperative equilibrium when

δ > max  DC − CC , DC − CC  .
 CC − CD DC − DD
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In general, then, States A and B are more likely to succeed with universalist cooperation (a) the longer they expect their relationship to last
and the more iterations they expect, (b) the higher their respective discount factors, and (c) the greater are cooperative payoffs relative to
defection payoffs. In the best case, each state anticipates numerous iterations of the universalist game, and whatever short-term loss it suffers
from deferring to the other state’s bankruptcy regime now will be more
than offset by reciprocal deference extended by the other state in the future.

IV. Fitting Theory to Facts: Conditions of
Play in International Bankruptcy
Given these conditions for cooperation, how likely is universalism?139
In this Part, I discuss the particular conditions of play in international
bankruptcy, showing that they will not be conducive to universalist cooperation. Such conditions will impede simple reciprocity strategies—
whether unilateral or even treaty based—which universalists have en140
dorsed. First, universalist commitments will be fuzzy, relying on
standards and judicial discretion instead of clear-cut rules. Fuzzy commitments mean that states will disagree on what counts as cooperation.
Interpretive disagreement will garble the messages conveyed and received via rewards and punishments. Second, judges are typically central
to bankruptcy proceedings, but the judicial role is not conducive to implementing reciprocity strategies. Finally, once we move beyond our
bilateral example to consider multilateral universalism, the obstacles become well-nigh insurmountable. Even if, between pairs of states, the
shadow of the future might be sufficient to induce cooperation and other
See Morrow, supra note 133, at 266; Axelrod, supra note 101, at 59 n.4.
139. As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that even if State A and State B have
long time horizons and expect frequent interaction in terms of opportunities for crossborder
bankruptcy cooperation; even if their respective discounting of future payoffs is not too severe; and even if the payoff structure of their universalist dilemma is hospitable to
cooperation, these conditions do not assure cooperation. Though these conditions vastly improve its prospects, cooperation is never guaranteed. Even under ideal conditions, mutual
defection is still always a subgame-perfect equilibrium in iterated prisoners’ dilemma games.
See Morrow, supra note 133, at 267. Two states attempting to cooperate through reciprocity
strategies still need to coordinate on which equilibrium strategies they are playing and what
punishment will be used to enforce cooperation. Otherwise, they may settle in to a pattern of
repeated mutual defection. See id. at 266. In addition, as a practical matter, conditional strategies are often politically difficult to sell to domestic constituents. See Oye, supra note 83, at
16.
140. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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obstacles could be overcome, these auspicious conditions become far
less likely in the multilateral context. Moreover, as the number of interested states increases, the likelihood of sufficiently favorable conditions
across all states diminishes.
Taken individually, no single factor necessarily rules out cooperation. In other contexts, similar obstacles have been overcome, typically
through international regimes and institutions. In the next Part, I discuss
the role that regimes play in addressing impediments to international
cooperation. Though universalists have not specifically considered it, I
discuss the possibility of a universalist regime, but find one both unlikely
to emerge and unlikely to be able to solve the particular set of problems
universalism raises.
A. Fuzzy Commitments
Specifying the universalist commitment with precision will be difficult. In this section, I explain the tendency toward fuzzy universalist
commitments, before exploring its significance in subsequent sections.
Largely for technical reasons, defining the basic jurisdiction of the
universalist court will necessarily involve some vagueness, leaving dis141
cretion to judges. Two significant areas are particularly problematic.
The first is the specification of rules for identifying the home country.
The second is the problem of defining the scope of the home country
court’s bankruptcy jurisdiction, that is, identifying the local laws or specific issue areas that are displaced by home country bankruptcy law.
Lynn LoPucki’s seminal challenge to universalism first raised ques142
tions concerning the determinacy of the home country rule. He argued
that the “home country” concept is not only indeterminate, but that any
determinate rule would be susceptible to eve-of-bankruptcy manipulation—forum shopping—by debtors. He cites egregious cases of debtors
141. Paul Stephan offers a public choice explanation for standards in international commercial law. He argues that within the international groups producing unified international
commercial laws, such as UNCITRAL, the interaction of technical experts, who essentially
produce the initial versions of reform proposals, with wider approving bodies, which must
contend with interest group pressure in the process of adopting any proposal, results in the
adoption of instruments with few rules that would impose costs on any organized group. Instead, these instruments delay hard choices by leaving actual outcomes to the discretion of
future decision makers. See Stephan, supra note 17, at 759. With respect to the UNCITRAL
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, Stephan further notes that the broad discretion left to
bankruptcy tribunals in that instrument enhances the power and prestige of insolvency professionals. They therefore had incentive to support the Model Law despite its creation of greater
uncertainty in international insolvency situations. See id. at 787.
142. See LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy, supra note 25, at 713–25.
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moving their headquarters or divesting assets just prior to filing in order
143
to facilitate access to favorable fora. No workable definition of “home
country” is possible because greater determinacy begets greater manipu144
lability. According to LoPucki, indeterminacy on this basic issue belies
the claimed predictability and related efficiency advantages of universalism.
Universalists reply that no hard-and-fast rule is necessary, since the
controversial cases will be few. In most cases, the home country will be
145
readily identifiable. Moreover, a “principal place of business” or “cen146
ter of main interests” standard has worked passably in other contexts.
143. As LoPucki notes:
Debtors could accomplish [forum] shops by a variety of means. The most obvious
means would be to move the company’s headquarters to the preferred country before filing the case. Contrary to the assertions of some universalists, moving the
headquarters of a large company is neither difficult nor unusual. Such moves were
made on the eves of several major domestic bankruptcies. While an international
move theoretically might be more difficult, they are hardly unknown. For example,
BCCI moved its headquarters from London to Abu Dhabi shortly before filing its
bankruptcy case in Luxembourg. Dreco Energy moved its headquarters and its center of gravity from Canada to the United States on the eve of its bankruptcy and
then moved it back afterwards. To do this, Dreco divested itself of its Canadian
properties and Canadian employees before filing its bankruptcy case in Houston,
Texas, and then it did the opposite after concluding its case.
Id. at 722 (citations omitted). Fruit of the Loom shopped itself into a Cayman Islands bankruptcy proceeding through an eve-of-bankruptcy corporate reorganization. See LoPucki,
Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 24, at 2231 & n.71 (describing various eve-ofbankruptcy strategies available to corporate groups that wish to forum shop).
144. See LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy, supra note 25, at 722–23;
LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 24, at 2235.
145. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 8, at 2317 (“[T]he marginal cases will
be few.”); Guzman, supra note 21, at 2207 (“[T]here is widespread agreement . . . that, in the
vast majority of cases, the home country will be easy to identify—making the issue a minor
question.”); Westbrook, Lessons of Maxwell, supra note 75, at 2541 (noting unusual case of
Maxwell, in which identification of home country was debatable). See also Rasmussen, A New
Approach, supra note 52, at 12 (“In most situations, it will be clear which country is the home
of the debtor.”).
146. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 8, at 2316. Place of incorporation
might be used as a proxy, but that would be subject to adjustment as the facts required. See id.
at 2317.
Westbrook cites the Brussels Convention as an example of a successful articulation of
rules for adjudicatory jurisdiction. See id. However, the reference is inapt. The Brussels Convention concerns states’ obligation to recognize foreign civil judgments. It delineates
acceptable and unacceptable bases for the rendering court’s jurisdiction over the defendantjudgment debtor in civil cases. In that context, the possibility of multiple bases for jurisdiction
works no great harm. It creates no opportunities for endgame manipulation, since multiple
bases of jurisdiction merely broaden a plaintiff’s litigation options based on the defendant’s
activities. By contrast, indeterminacy of the home country standard under universalism does
create opportunities for strategic behavior by debtors, since it enables debtors to manipulate
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A “raw, unsophisticated choice” among rules is unnecessary; instead, the
147
choice may be “multidimensional.” According to universalists, then,
such a standard works well for most cases, and judges will presumably
apply discretion to the few cases involving indeterminacy or possible
debtor manipulation. Without resolving this debate as to its efficiency
consequences, I discuss the effect of indeterminacy on states’ reciprocity
148
strategies below.
A second area of fuzziness involves the interface between home
country bankruptcy law and local nonbankruptcy law. Once the home
country is determined, there is the further issue of determining the exact
contours of the home country court’s extraterritorial reach, that is, the
scope of local laws and local court jurisdiction that are overridden by the
home country bankruptcy regime. Universalism selects home country
law applied by home country courts, but only as to bankruptcy issues.
Deciding where bankruptcy law ends and nonbankruptcy law begins,
however, is not always an easy issue. Put differently, the scope of the
universalist choice of law and forum selection rules is not self149
defining.
These interface issues will be especially problematic in two areas:
creditor entitlements and regulatory issues. As to the former, creditors’
rights in bankruptcy generally depend on their entitlements outside of
bankruptcy. Bankruptcy law does not create the contract or property
rights that creditors assert against the debtor in bankruptcy. Those rights
exist independent of bankruptcy law. But deciding whether a given issue
is a bankruptcy issue or one involving nonbankruptcy entitlements is not
always simple. For example, when a German debtor has fraudulently
conveyed land in Belgium to an innocent third party, it pits the debtor’s
creditors against the innocent purchaser. Should German bankruptcy law
applied by the German court determine who is entitled to the land? Or
should the Belgian court apply its own property laws to decide the ques-

applicable bankruptcy law and the appropriate bankruptcy forum through their own endgame
maneuvers, to the detriment of creditors. Only if the Brussels Convention conditioned jurisdiction over defendants based on plaintiff’s activities would the comparison hold. Such an
approach to jurisdiction would, of course, be absurd. See supra Part II.B.
147. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 8, at 2317.
148. See infra Part IV.B.
149. Universalists recognize these problems as well. See Westbrook & Trautman, supra
note 9, at 662 (describing difficulty of deciding where local property law ends and universalist
bankruptcy rules should take over); See also Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note
24, at 462 (distinguishing choice of law from forum choice, and illustrating when intersection
of local and home country laws may create difficult questions).
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tion?150 In general, ownership rights in land are determined by the law
151
and in the courts of the jurisdiction in which the land is located, which
in our example would indicate Belgian law and courts. However, determining entitlements to the land would also have clear distributional
consequences for creditors, which is a fundamental bankruptcy issue.
From this perspective, the German bankruptcy regime should govern.
How this issue is ultimately resolved is not as important for our purposes
as is the simple illustrative value of the example. It highlights the inevi152
table murkiness in the content of the universalist commitment.
Regulatory issues may also be particularly nettlesome. To what extent may bankruptcy law modify local regulatory obligations to which a
debtor would otherwise be subject? For example, may local environmental clean-up obligations be superseded by home country rescue
rules? May the universalist bankruptcy court relieve the debtor from such
regulatory obligations in a non-home country? Resolution of these issues
153
within a single national jurisdiction may not be straightforward. Resolution across jurisdictions is likely to be quite messy and
154
unpredictable. Consider another example. Under U.S. law, certain
bankruptcy-related offerings of securities by a debtor enjoy exemption
155
from otherwise applicable U.S. securities laws. Should all or part of
150. See Westbrook & Trautman, supra note 9, at 661–62.
151. See id. at 661 (regarding choice of law); See Brussels & Lugano Conventions, supra
note 78, art. 16(1) (regarding exclusive jurisdiction of courts where immovable property is
situated).
152. Security interests present similar issues. A creditor’s secured status in bankruptcy
generally depends on its secured status outside of bankruptcy. Analysts generally agree that
this question of secured status should be determined based on nonbankruptcy law, while the
effect of that status in bankruptcy is a question of bankruptcy law. See Westbrook & Trautman,
supra note 9, at 661; see also Ulrich Drobnig, Secured Credit in International Insolvency
Proceedings, 33 Tex. Int’l L.J. 53, 65 (1998). This distinction may prove elusive in particular
cases.
153. See, e.g., Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985) (holding that prepetition environmental clean-up obligation was liability on a claim and therefore subject to bankruptcy
discharge); Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494 (1986) (holding
that Chapter 7 trustee may not abandon contaminated estate property in contravention of local
health and safety laws); New York v. Exxon Corp., 932 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that
city’s nonbankruptcy action for prepetition clean-up reimbursement costs fell within police
and regulatory exception to automatic stay). See generally LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 24, at 2237 (discussing indeterminacy of scope of universalist bankruptcy
jurisdiction).
154. These issues are not likely to be clarified over time. Even if some issues recur,
different courts from different legal regimes may take different approaches, with none binding
on any other. See Stephan, supra note 17, at 792 (discussing lack of density and stability of
international commercial law).
155. See 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994). See generally Richard E. Mendales, We Can Work It
Out: The Interaction of Bankruptcy and Securities Regulation in the Workout Context, 46
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the local securities regulation as applied to debtor firms be considered a
part of the local “bankruptcy law” overridden by a universalist assertion
of extraterritorial bankruptcy jurisdiction?
The answer to these questions are not straightforward and may depend on the specific contexts in which they are raised. “Analytically, one
must determine the character of the issue before determining the govern156
ing law.” Given the complexity of large multinational firms and the
unique issues that may arise in particular cases, characterization of legal
issues will often have to be improvised. Universalism transplants one
state’s bankruptcy regime into another’s legal system, raising unavoidable issues concerning the scope and boundaries of the foreign regime.
The resolution of issues that may be critical to specific cases will often
157
have to be tailored on an ad hoc basis. As with the determination of the
debtor’s home country, these interface issues will often have to be decided by judges relying on standards and exercising discretion ex post.

Rutgers L. Rev. 1211 (1994). For discussion of the opposite problem—opting out of U.S.
securities regulation and effects on the domestic bankruptcy regime—see Choi & Guzman,
Portable Reciprocity, supra note 12, at 936.
156. Westbrook & Trautman, supra note 9, at 586.
157. The complexity of the choice of law rules of the European Union Insolvency Regulation shows the difficulty of elaborating bankruptcy choice of law rules with particularity. See
Council Regulation 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, 2000 OJ (L 160) 1 [hereinafter EU
Insolvency Regulation]. The EU Insolvency Regulation institutes a compromise system that
incorporates aspects of both universalism and territoriality. It provides for a universalist main
proceeding, which is conducted in the state where the “centre of a debtor’s main interests is situated,” see id. art. 3(1), and which has extraterritorial effect throughout the EU. See id. arts. 16–18.
It is also apparently intended to “encompass the debtor’s assets on a worldwide basis and to affect all creditors, wherever located.” Ian F. Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International
Law: National and International Approaches 260 (P.B. Carter QC ed., 1999). On the other
hand, however, separate territorial proceedings are also authorized in states where the debtor has
an establishment, preserving the ability of non-home countries to distribute value pursuant to
their own local laws. See EU Insolvency Regulation, supra, art. 3(2). These secondary proceedings must be winding-up proceedings, and they only affect the debtor’s assets within the
particular state. See id. art. 3(2)–(3).
Article Four of the EU Insolvency Regulation identifies forum law as the basic choice of
law for insolvency proceedings: “the law applicable to insolvency proceedings and their effects shall be that of the Member State within the territory of which such proceedings are
opened.” See id. art 4(1). Article Four relies on thirteen subsections for detail. See id. art. 4(2).
Articles Five through Fifteen then elaborate specific exceptions. See id. arts. 5–15. For example, forum law will not displace other law otherwise applicable to an employment contract
with respect to the effect of insolvency proceedings on that contract. See id. art. 10. The most
dramatic exception, from a universalist perspective, is contained in Article Five, which provides that as to debtor assets located outside the territory of the forum state, the situs law
governing secured creditors’ rights in rem, including the right to seize and dispose of collateral, trumps forum law. See id. art. 5.
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B. Consequences for Reciprocity
Universalists do not contest the existence of these various muddy ar158
eas that may require some exercise of judicial discretion. Instead,
universalists contest their significance. Universalists admit that reliance
on standards and judicial discretion may sacrifice a bit of predictability
for creditors, but such indeterminacy at the margins is tolerable. In any
event, universalism with standards is still an improvement over territori159
ality.
To date, this debate over determinacy has focused on efficiency, i.e.,
whether indeterminacy does or does not undercut universalist claims of
improved ex ante predictability. However, the effect of indeterminacy on
the comparative efficiency of universalism only matters if we assume
that an otherwise idealized universalist system is already in place. But
that may never happen. A prior question exists concerning the political
consequences of indeterminacy, in particular, its effect on reciprocity
strategies among states. Even if fuzzy commitments would not undermine the comparative efficiency of an otherwise idealized universalist
system, fuzzy commitments will make the realization of that idealized
system less likely.
Reliance on standards implemented through ex post judicial discretion creates ambiguity concerning states’ commitment to universalism
and makes reciprocal cooperation difficult to achieve. Any professed
commitment may not be credible, so states will be reluctant to make or
160
rely on such commitments ex ante. As important, the fuzzy quality of
the commitment will make it difficult for one state to interpret whether
another has cooperated or defected. A state’s refusal to defer to the edicts
of foreign bankruptcy proceedings is certainly transparent, but whether
that refusal breaches the state’s universalist commitment may be unclear
in a given case. With fuzzy commitments, good faith disagreement over
compliance issues will not be uncommon.
With respect to identification of the home country, for example,
certainty in most cases may not be good enough. Acting entirely in good
faith, states will disagree as to which is the home country. Fuzzy
commitments allow ostensibly cooperative states to assert plausible
competing claims to home country status, thereby frustrating the
158. “The key point is that the line-drawing problem cannot be avoided; it can only be
placed at different points on the commercial spectrum. . . .” Westbrook & Trautman, supra
note 9, at 584.
159. See Guzman, supra note 21, at 2208.
160. See supra notes 125–126 and accompanying text.
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reciprocity strategy at the heart of the development of universalist
cooperation. Ambiguity enables State A to insist on its territorial
prerogative, refusing to recognize any claimed extraterritorial effect of
State B’s insolvency proceeding while also claiming no violation of its
161
universalist commitment. In the face of ambiguous commitments, the
best the two states may be able to do is a rough ad hoc territorial
162
compromise. Two examples illustrate these points.
1. Example 1: The European Union
The history of EU negotiations over a cross-border insolvency convention exemplifies states’ reluctance to contract on the basis of
ambiguous commitments. At one stage of negotiations, universalism had
been considered and extensively discussed, but indeterminacy in the
specification of the home country was a sticking point.
[A]s regards the primary criterion based upon the location of the
debtor’s ‘centre of administration’, there was scope for divergent
approaches to be adopted when applying the concept to the facts
of actual cases. Although each version of the Draft supplied a
definition of the expression as meaning ‘the place where the
debtor usually administers his main interests’, this appears only
to raise a whole series of further questions. . . . Although both
versions [of the Draft] embody a rebuttable presumption, in the
case of firms, companies and legal persons, that the registered
161. State A may even attempt its own universalist proceeding, claiming extraterritorial
effect in State B. This would be necessary from State A’s perspective only if significant debtor
assets were located in or otherwise subject to the de facto control of State B.
162. International bankruptcy cooperation has already evolved in this direction. In the
absence of any international framework for cooperation, judges and lawyers have fashioned ad
hoc “protocols” in particular cases. As Evan D. Flaschen and Ronald J. Silverman explain:
In the absence of a formal treaty, practitioners and courts have created what are essentially case-specific, private international insolvency treaties.
. . . The Protocols that have been implemented to date have been influenced both
by considerations of universality and certain constraints of territoriality. They strive,
in the first instance, to promote an efficient, worldwide coordination and resolution
of multiple insolvency proceedings. At the same time, they serve to protect fundamental, local rights material to each of the legal fora involved.
. . . Although the relief provided by Protocols necessarily varies to suit circumstances and legal environments, the essence of the Protocols is to provide a
mechanism that controls how the parties will communicate, take actions, and apply
both procedural and substantive elements of law.
Evan D. Flaschen & Ronald J. Silverman, Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation Protocols, 33
Tex. Int’l L.J. 587, 589 (1998) (citations omitted).
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office is the place where the debtor’s main interests are usually
administered, the manner of rebutting this presumption, and the
degree of proof needed, are left uncertain. Given the scope for
different views regarding what amount to a debtor’s ‘main’ interests, the potential instability of this basis of jurisdiction was
163
disturbing.
This indeterminacy made universalism problematic, and states were
unwilling to commit to it.
The EU Insolvency Regulation that finally emerged in May 2000 is
164
essentially a territorial system with universalist pretensions. It gives a
formal nod to universalism, providing for a “main proceeding” in the
state where the “centre of a debtor’s main interests” is located, with ex165
traterritorial effect throughout the EU. But the Regulation allows
territorial winding-up proceedings as well: in any other state in which
the debtor has an establishment, a “secondary proceeding” can be initiated. This winding-up proceeding—essentially a liquidation—trumps the
166
main proceeding as to assets located in that state.
2. Example 2: Maxwell Communications
The famous Maxwell case167 provides a nice illustration of the difficulties of identifying the home country. While admittedly, neither the
United States nor the United Kingdom—the two states primarily in168
and
volved—had undertaken a clear universalist commitment,
therefore had no legal obligation to defer, it would be difficult to imagine
163. See Fletcher, supra note 157, at 253 n.21 (discussing negotiation of 1970 and
1980 draft treaties).
164. The EU Insolvency Regulation effectively legislates the provisions of the European
Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, which was duly negotiated among EU members but never entered into force because the United Kingdom’s subsequent refusal to ratify.
See European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, opened for signature, Nov. 23,
1995, 35 I.L.M. 1223 (1996) [hereinafter EU Insolvency Convention]. The UK refusal apparently had nothing to do with the convention itself but with some concurrent friction over
Continental reluctance to allow imports of UK beef following the scare over mad cow disease.
Following expiration of the ratification period for the treaty, the EU Council promulgated the
same rules in the form of a regulation.
165. See EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 157, arts. 3(1), 16–18.
166. See id., art. 3(2)–(3).
167. Maxwell Communication Corp. v. Barclays Bank (In re Maxwell Communication
Corp.), 170 B.R. 800 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d, 186 B.R. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff ’d, 93
F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996).
168. Some universalists claim that Section 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
§ 304, expresses a U.S. commitment to universalism. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra
note 8, at 2323. Others find Section 304 indeterminate. See Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note
30, at 783.
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that either state would have relinquished its claim to home country status
in any event.
Maxwell Communications was a multinational publishing empire
headquartered in England, from where it was managed and whence its
financial affairs were conducted. While its major debts were incurred in
England, however, its principal assets were in the United States. Two
U.S. publishing companies wholly owned by Maxwell, Macmillan, Inc.
and Official Airline Guide, Inc., accounted for about 80% of Maxwell’s
169
assets.
Maxwell initially petitioned for an administration in England,170 but
when the judge appointed administrators not to the liking of the company, the company filed a Chapter 11 petition with the U.S. bankruptcy
171
court in New York. Most universalists would probably agree that the
172
United Kingdom was the home country. However, the U.S. court retained primary jurisdiction over the case, along with the U.K. court. This
retention of jurisdiction was no surprise, given the sheer size of the estate, the value of assets in the United States, and perhaps the professional
173
fees at stake.
[M]ost of the debtor’s assets were in the United States. This fact
was no doubt an important part of Judge Brozman’s [the U.S.
bankruptcy judge’s] insisting on retaining United States jurisdiction and requiring the concurrence of a United States examiner
in major decisions in the case. Yet the court had recognized from
the start that the center of gravity of the company was in the
United Kingdom, the location of its principal executive offices.
For that very reason, the court had ceded primary authority for
corporate governance to the British administrators, while protecting against potential injury to U.S. interests through
169. See Maxwell, 170 B.R. at 802. In 1988, Maxwell had acquired Macmillan for $2.6
billion and Official Airline Guide for $750 million. See id. These two subsidiaries in turn
owned assets all over the world. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 8, at 2321 n.184.
170. Administration is a rescue proceeding under English law. See infra note 178.
171. See Leonard Hoffman, L.J., Cross-Border Insolvency: A British Perspective, 64
Fordham L. Rev. 2507, 2514 (1996).
172. See Westbrook, Lessons of Maxwell, supra note 75, at 2537, 2541 n.44 (noting that
Maxwell’s “center of gravity” was in the United Kingdom, and that the company was “essentially English”). Universalists identify principal place of business and center of main interests
as appropriate standards for determining the home country, while rejecting location of assets
as ordinarily indeterminate and subject to manipulation. See supra note 146; Guzman, supra
note 21, at 2207.
173. See LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy, supra note 25, at 721 (noting significance of professional fees in courts’ competition for cases).
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maintenance of the Chapter 11 case and appointment of the ex174
aminer.
Maxwell’s bankruptcy proceeded simultaneously in both courts. The
U.K. administrators and the U.S. examiner, appointed by the U.S. judge
to work with the administrators, worked out a “Protocol” to govern the
175
conduct of the joint proceedings. Ultimately, a “Plan and Scheme” was
176
formulated, which complied with the laws of both jurisdictions, pursuant to which Maxwell’s businesses were sold as going concerns and
177
creditors were paid.
Maxwell no doubt represents a remarkable achievement in terms of
cooperation and coordination in an enormously complex international
bankruptcy. However, it also offers a stark illustration of a type of case
for which the universalist home country standard and judicial discretion
would yield indeterminacy, requiring ad hoc territorial compromise.
Jay Westbrook portrays Maxwell as the unusual case “where the
178
debtor’s home country might be subject to some plausible debate.” But
174. Westbrook, Lessons of Maxwell, supra note 75, at 2537 (emphasis supplied).
175. See in re Maxwell Communication Corp., 170 B.R. 802 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994),
aff’d, 186 B.R. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996).
176. See id. The single scheme represented both a plan of reorganization under U.S. law
and a scheme of arrangement under U.K. law. See id.
177. See id.
178. See Westbrook, Lessons of Maxwell, supra note 75, at 2541. Westbrook has also attempted a universalist rehabilitation of Maxwell, portraying it recently as a “classic application
of modified universalism.” He claims that the case was “centralized” in the United Kingdom,
and that the U.S. examiner merely stood by to guard U.S. interests. Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 8, at 2321. However, the fact that the Plan and Scheme was required to
comply with U.S. as well as British law belies Westbrook’s characterization of only incidental
U.S. court involvement.
Moreover, comments by the British judge in Maxwell paint an entirely different picture.
The interjection of the U.S. bankruptcy system was no trivial matter from the British perspective. English administration is a very different creature from Chapter 11 in the United States,
which is an arrangement negotiated among debtor management and creditors. See Tung, Confirmation and Claims Trading, supra note 5, at 1689 (describing plan confirmation process).
The English administrator, by contrast, does not need to negotiate with creditors or the
debtor’s management, but instead takes complete control of the debtor company in a matter of
hours after his appointment. “He has full powers to do whatever he likes. . . . He can employ
the old management if he likes, but if he decides not to, he simply collects the keys of their
automobiles and leaves them to go home on the subway.” Hoffman, L.J., supra note 171, at
2514–15. For the administrators of Maxwell, Chapter 11 was something of a culture shock.
[T]he English administrators found that they had to deal with an Examiner who was
responsible to a judge who in turn had to have regard to the various interest groups
who jockey for position in any Chapter 11 proceedings. Even the old management,
who would simply have been shown the door in England, had their leverage which
enabled them to keep a place at the negotiating table. The administrators therefore
found that to get anything done—for example, to raise interim finance to keep the
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even if the number of these cases is small, the cases are likely to be significant. States will be most likely to vie for home country status—or at
least contest other states’ claims to such status—in cases involving significant local interests on each side, cases involving large firms with
significant assets and huge liabilities at issue, cases for which the immediate costs of deferring are quite high. Given the stakes in a case like
Maxwell, any plausible claim to home country status will likely be
pressed by each state. Likewise, even where the identity of the home
country is not in dispute, non-home countries can be expected to press
for a narrow jurisdiction for the home country court. They will define
broadly the scope of what count as local nonbankruptcy issues, to be
179
determined by local courts according to local law.
***
Fuzzy commitments allow each state to assert plausible good faith
claims to compliance. This lack of clarity weakens the credibility of any
universalist commitment and creates problems of misperception and
misinterpretation: states will have trouble distinguishing cooperation
180
from defection. The ambiguity inherent in standards, and haziness with
respect to whether the particular application of a standard was “correct”
given the underlying circumstances, impair states’ abilities to coordinate

subsidiary companies going—required a great deal of expensive and timeconsuming negotiation.
Id. At the end of the day, the English administrators opted for the Protocol simply because it
was less expensive than trying to have the U.S. Chapter 11 proceeding terminated. See id. at
2516. It is quite clear from the British perspective that administration was held hostage to the
structure and process of Chapter 11.
[T]he administrators told me that they were having trouble in New York. Naturally
they would have preferred simply to take charge of everything as they were used to
doing in England. That would have been quicker and cheaper. But they had been
advised that an attempt to terminate the Chapter 11 proceedings in New York would
be expensive and delay matters without necessarily being successful. So they felt
that the interests of creditors were best served by agreeing to the Protocol.
Id. at 2515–16.
179. Issues concerning the interface between home country bankruptcy jurisdiction and
local nonbankruptcy jurisdiction will be difficult to anticipate or resolve ex ante through clear
rules. Instead, as with identification of the home country, resolution of jurisdictional interface
issues will depend on judges’ discretionary application of imprecise standards ex post. See
supra notes 153–157 and accompanying text.
180. This credible commitment problem contributed to states disaffection for universalism in negotiations preceding the EU Insolvency Regulation. See Fletcher, supra note 157,
at 253 & n.21.
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on what constitutes cooperation versus defection. Therefore, the administering of appropriate rewards and punishments becomes difficult.
Ambiguity and uncertainty about defection . . . wreak havoc
with [the reciprocity] mechanism of sustaining cooperation. Under many circumstances, determining whether a state’s actions
constitute defection may be difficult or impossible. For example,
in the presence of an unforeseen contingency, reasonable people
may disagree about how a given agreement should be applied.
When they disagree, they cannot coordinate their responses, im181
plying that full cooperation cannot be sustained.
Even with perfect monitoring and ability to identify defection, cooperation is not easy to sustain. But when “noise” is introduced, sustained
cooperation becomes even less likely. For example, even if—in the absence of uncertainty—two states could coordinate on playing Tit for Tat
182
strategies to yield a cooperative equilibrium, introducing uncertainty
reduces both states’ long-run average payoffs to no better than random
183
plays. Moreover, this result obtains even if only a very low probability
of misperception exists. A low probability simply means that it will take
longer for a misperception to arise, but once it does, it will also take
184
longer to clear up. In other words, any noise renders Tit for Tat no bet185
ter than random plays.
In a noisy environment, more generous strategies than Tit for Tat
may enable improved cooperation. For example, a modified Tit for Tat
strategy that forbears from retaliating for some percentage of the other
player’s perceived defections has been shown to be effective in noisy
186
environments. Such a forgiving strategy enables error correction and

181. Barry R. Weingast, A Rational Choice Perspective on the Role of Ideas: Shared Belief Systems and State Sovereignty in International Cooperation, 23 Pol. & Soc’y. 449, 450
(1995). See also Oye, supra note 83, at 15 (discussing conditions of play that may limit effectiveness of reciprocity strategies).
182. See supra note 138.
183. Per Molander, The Optimal Level of Generosity in a Selfish, Uncertain Environment, 29 J. Conflict Res. 611, 612 (1985); Nalebuff, supra note 130, at 93. Once a mistake
occurs, Tit for Tat causes the mistake to echo back and forth, as each state retaliates for the
other state’s prior defection. In this process of punishing perceived defections, a mistake is as
likely to get compounded as it is to be fixed.
184. See Nalebuff, supra note 130, at 93.
185. See Molander, supra note 183, at 612. If the probability of misperception reaches
fifty percent, then cooperation becomes hopeless. Given the slim prospects for cooperation,
each state might as well defect in every round. See Nalebuff, supra note 130, at 93.
186. See Jianzhong Wu & Robert Axelrod, How to Cope with Noise in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, 39 J. Conflict Res. 183, 184 (1995). See also Jonathan Bendor, Roderick

3/19/02 10:28 AM

TUNGTYPE.DOC

52

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 23:1

dampens the effects of mistaken vendettas between players. The more
forgiving the strategy, the more quickly an error can be corrected and
cooperation restored. However, adopting a generous or forgiving strategy
comes with a cost: generosity exposes a player to greater risk of exploi187
tation. The immediate costs of generosity and forbearance may be
quite high. A generous strategy may therefore be unattractive for many
states.
Without accurate matching of rewards and punishments to cooperation and defection, any message among players becomes garbled.
Reciprocity is frustrated; cooperation is undermined.
C. The Role of Courts and Judges
Compounding the problem of fuzzy commitments, the involvement
of courts and judges in deciding questions of universalist recognition
creates problems for cooperation. In most industrial countries, a corporate insolvency proceeding is a legal proceeding. It is filed with a court
and monitored by a judge, who is the logical candidate to decide questions of cross-border recognition. Establishing conditional policies is
188
politically difficult in any event. Implementing conditional strategies
through courts and judges may be futile.
By hypothesis, states enjoy long-run payoffs from universalist cooperation (i.e., extraterritorial application of their bankruptcy laws in
appropriate cases) and suffer long-run punishments from defection (i.e.,
nonrecognition of their extraterritorial assertions of bankruptcy jurisdiction). However, judges are not states; though states may be repeat
189
players in the universalist cooperation game, judges typically are not.
For each judge, the decision whether to defer to a foreign insolvency
proceeding looks more like a one-shot game. The judge will understand
M. Kramer, & Suzanne Stout, When in Doubt . . . Cooperation in a Noisy Prisoner’s Dilemma, 35 J. Conflict Res. 691 (1991) (discussing generous variations of Tit for Tat).
187. See Bendor et al., supra note 186, at 712. Prisoners’ dilemma tournament experiments in noisy environments show a sharp trade off between generosity and exploitability. See
Jonathan Bendor, Uncertainty and the Evolution of Cooperation, 37 J. Conflict Res. 709
(1993).
188. See supra note 139.
189. Some states might have only one or a few judges or other officials charged with
overseeing corporate bankruptcies. The United States. is arguably moving in that direction, as
the district of Delaware now fields over sixty percent of all large public company bankruptcy
filings in the United States. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a Race to the Bottom, 54 Vand. L.
Rev. 231, at 234–35 (2001). Even in that case, however, courts and judicial officers will still
likely suffer from the institutional deficiencies described in the text that preclude their effective implementation of reciprocity strategies.
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the immediate prejudice to local interests from deferring to a foreign
proceeding, but may not perceive or care about the long-term consequences of defection. The judge’s dominant single-play strategy is
190
therefore defection.
Judges and courts are not institutionally equipped to play iterated
games. Each judge applies laws to a specific case. Individual judges will
ordinarily have neither the mandate nor the resources to follow the various rounds of play across cases. Each judge will therefore have difficulty
191
matching a “tit” to the appropriate “tat.” Judges will be unable to dis192
pense rewards and punishments appropriately. In addition, judges do
not individually enjoy payoffs from cooperation or suffer punishments
from defection. They are not charged with the representation of state
interests over time as are the political branches of government—
legislatures and executive officials—and therefore are unlikely to internalize and effect the long-run maximization goals of their respective
193
states. Officers of the political branches may be appropriate agents to
dole out rewards and punishments, but judges are not. The judicial function does not lend itself well to conducting foreign relations while
194
deciding specific cases.
190. See Dodge, supra note 83:
While it may be true that states will continue to decide choice-of-law cases indefinitely, for the judge who makes the choice-of-law decision each case looks more
like a single play game. Thus there is little reason to think that cooperation will
evolve in conflicts or extraterritoriality based on the individual decisions of judges.
Id. at 162; Joel P. Trachtman, Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation of Government
Responsibility, 26 Vand J. Transnat’l L. 975, 1022 (1994).
191. See supra note 129 (describing Tit for Tat strategy in repeat prisoner’s dilemma).
192. Cf. Sterk, supra note 83, at 1009 (noting similar problems for game theory predictions of cooperation in choice of law context).
193. Public choice scholars remind us as well of the political agency costs. Judges may
have private interests that differ from the national interest. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 87,
at 1226.
194. [T]he political branches are better equipped to weigh the long-term benefits of
compromise against the short-term detriments of deferring to another jurisdiction in a particular case. “The stimuli in the diplomatic forum that encourage effective balancing of short term
against long term interests are not operative in the municipal judicial forum except in very
general terms.” Dodge, supra note 83, at 159 (quoting Harold G. Maier, Interest Balancing
and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 Am. J. Comp. L. 579, 594 (1983)). See generally Oye,
supra note 83, at 16 (discussing control issues in effecting reciprocity).
These judge-related issues will vary from state to state. One could imagine a state with
relatively few insolvency judges and other professionals, who as a group take a strong international and universalist outlook. If the norms of this group developed in a way that paralleled
the state’s preference for universalist cooperation, then this professional elite might possibly
evolve into an effective enforcer of universalist reciprocity. On the other hand, in a state with a
large and diffuse group of insolvency judges and professionals, the emergence of group norms
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Regardless of other obstacles to universalist cooperation, because of
the role that judges and courts play in deciding on universalist recognition in specific cases, the repeat play that characterizes many
international commercial interactions will not likely cause the emergence of universalist cooperation.
D. Numbers Problems
Thus far, we have focused primarily on our hypothetical two-state
world and considered only the two-player prisoners’ dilemma. When we
move to a world with many states, “numbers problems” arise. Even if
bilateral universalism were not difficult enough to realize, multilateral
universalist cooperation is even less tractable. As the number of players
rises, cooperation issues become far more complex. Both establishing
and maintaining cooperation become more difficult.
The existence of commonly shared interests becomes less likely as
the number of potential adherents to a universalist arrangement increases. Recall that in our two-state model, we assumed that in both
states’ preference orderings, the mutual cooperation outcome—
195
reciprocal universalism—was preferred to mutual defection. We were
willing to grant this assumption in order to present an optimistic case for
universalism. We also noted, however, reasons why many states would
not prefer mutual universalism, but would instead prefer territoriality,
196
regardless of another state’s willingness to cooperate. As the number of
states rises, the assumption that each state prefers mutual cooperation to
mutual defection becomes a very strong one. Relaxing the assumption,
of course, means that multilateral universalism is doomed.
Even retaining this strong assumption about preference orderings,
states’ heterogeneity makes it less and less likely that the necessary conditions for sustained cooperation will hold for all of them. One state may
discount the future severely. Another may have special domestic political
favoring a unified universalist approach may be less likely. See Robert C. Ellickson, Order
Without Law 177 (1991) (discussing significance of close-knit settings for emergence of
welfare-maximizing norms). States might respond to this problem by removing cooperation
decisions from judges and centralizing them in the hands of trade or foreign affairs officials.
Jay Westbrook has proposed that states create domestic institutions to certify for their respective judiciaries which other states qualify for reciprocity. See supra note 44. This thoughtful
approach might reduce some information costs, but it may cause other internal problems, as
states attempt to restructure domestically-focused judicial and administrative processes to
account for foreign affairs concerns.
195. That is, CC > DD. See supra Part III.B.
196. That is, a state may prefer deadlock: DC > CC and DD > CC. See supra Part II and
note 113.
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difficulty implementing a reciprocity strategy.197 Another may anticipate
only infrequent iterations of the international bankruptcy game, insufficient to make long-term cooperation worthwhile.
In particular, recall that in our two-state discussion, we noted that
roughly symmetric investment flows between our two states would be an
important condition related to “iterativeness”—each state’s expectation
concerning the frequency of iterations of the international bankruptcy
198
game. With multiple states, a rough multilateral symmetry with respect
to investment flows would also be required, so that each state might expect future benefits as the home country. However, as the number of
states increases, fulfillment of this condition becomes more and more
199
unlikely.
Even if conditions for cooperation are promising among multiple
states, transaction and information costs increase with the number of
states. Identifying shared interests and negotiating workable arrangements to the satisfaction of all the players becomes more expensive. In
addition, as the number of states increases, each state will have more
difficulty anticipating the future behavior of other states and assessing
200
the prospective value of future cooperative payoffs.
Consider the added complexity of negotiating a multilateral universalist agreement. Imagine, for example, several states—otherwise
favorably disposed to universalism absent these transaction and information costs—attempting to define the scope of the universalist choice of
law rule and to clarify the interface between bankruptcy law and non201
bankruptcy law. They must in effect decide what counts as a
bankruptcy issue (for which home country law applies) and distinguish
that from nonbankruptcy issues (as to which local law would apply).
Each state will have particular issue areas (for example, environmental
197. See supra note 139.
198. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
199. For states with strong commercial ties—the states of the European Community, for
example, or NAFTA or ASEAN—this condition might obtain. But even then, all the other
factors affecting cooperation would still have to align properly. Within most groups of states,
the frequency of expected iterations will differ as among the various pairs or coalitions, making for uneven cooperative impulses. State A may anticipate frequent crossborder insolvency
interaction with State B but not State C. Anticipating infrequent iterations with State C, State
A may be more willing to defect as to State C than to State B, since any cooperation by State
A with State C in the current round may be reciprocated only far into the future. Discounting
that future payoff to present value, State A may decide that the short-term gain from current
defection is worth more. Uneven cooperation will frustrate the emergence of cooperative
norms within the group as a whole.
200. See Oye, supra note 83, at 19.
201. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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or securities regulation202) that it will wish to insulate from possible displacement by the bankruptcy rules of each other state acting as home
country. To accomplish this, each state will have to obtain information
about every other state’s bankruptcy rules and sensitive issue areas, and
may need to engage in a bilateral negotiation with each other state to
resolve any potential conflict. With two states, of course, only one bilateral negotiation need occur. With three states, three separate bilateral
negotiations may be required. With four states, the number of bilateral
203
negotiations jumps to six, and so on. These increased transaction and
information costs erode the margin between the cooperative payoff and
the short-term gain from defection, making defection all the more attrac204
tive and cooperative agreements all the more difficult to achieve.
Recognizing and punishing defection also becomes more compli205
cated as numbers increase. I have already noted that reliance on
standards and discretion will engender ambiguity and misperception.
With multiple states, this problem is greatly exacerbated. For example,
even if identification of the home country were not controversial, the
number of unique interfaces between home country bankruptcy law and
local nonbankruptcy law multiplies as more states are involved. The
chances for previously unanticipated contingencies increase, thereby
increasing the likelihood of ambiguity in application of the original universalist agreement. Without an institution to provide definitive
206
resolution of ambiguities and to coordinate punishments for defection,
the potential for inconsistent cooperation among participants is high.
202. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
203. For n states, the number of bilateral negotiations will equal n * (n − 1) .

2
A casual look at the choice of law provisions in the EU Insolvency Regulation illustrates
the complexity of these bankruptcy-related choice of law issues for multiple states. See supra
note 157. See also Ian F. Fletcher, The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: Choice-of-Law Provisions, 33 Tex. Int’l L.J. 119 (1998). The existence of the already
well-developed and multifaceted EU regime no doubt facilitated negotiation of the EU Insolvency Convention, which was the precursor to the EU Insolvency Regulation. See supra note
157. See generally Keohane, supra note 86, at ch. 6 (explaining importance of international
regimes for reducing transaction costs and disseminating information). Absent the EU regime,
it is highly unlikely that such an agreement could have been reached.
204. See Oye, supra note 83, at 19.
205. See Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 83, at 235.
206. See Weingast, supra note 181, at 452 (describing coordination problem of interpreting agreement in light of unanticipated situation); cf. Giovanni Maggi, The Role of
Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation, 89 Am. Econ. Rev. 190 (1999)
(arguing that even without direct enforcement power, WTO through dispute settlement panels
acts as multilateral enforcement mechanism by verifying and publicizing violations, thereby
causing violator’s loss of reputation in trading community).
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This will inhibit the development of stable multilateral cooperative
norms. The sure payoff from immediate defection becomes much more
207
attractive, and the likelihood of defection increases. For all these reasons, decentralized multilateral cooperative arrangements are unlikely to
208
arise, and any that do will be quite fragile.
With the bankruptcy of an integrated multinational firm, all affected
states must cooperate in order to achieve the optimal cooperative out209
come, but one player’s defection will often trigger the defection of
210
others. In the Felixstowe case, these considerations played at least
some part in an English court’s refusal to defer to a U.S. proceeding. The
English court refused to turn over local English assets of a U.S. debtor in
211
Chapter 11 proceedings. Separate insolvency proceedings were apparently also underway or pending in France and several other European
countries. Besides the fact that English creditors would have been preju212
diced in the U.S. proceeding, the English court noted that in the French
insolvency proceeding, the French court likewise refused to defer to the
213
United States. If the French would not defer, why should the English?

207. See Oye, supra note 83, at 19.
208. “Although game theory does not rule out the possibility of n-state cooperation, the
assumptions required for such an outcome are quite strong and usually unrealistic. For this
reason, we doubt the utility of n-player prisoner’s dilemmas as an explanation for multilateral
or “universal” behavioral regularities.” Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 86, at 1130. Cf. Miles
Kahler, Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers, 46 Int’l Org. 681 (1992) (describing
institutional devices to facilitate multilateral cooperation with large numbers); Robert Pahre,
Multilateral Cooperation in an Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, 38 J. Conflict Resol. 326
(1994) (arguing that under certain assumptions, multilateralism may be more effective for
cooperation than bilateralism).
209. A situation involving multiple players does not always create an n-player prisoners’
dilemma, but a series of bilateral prisoners’ dilemmas between the different pairs of players. In
that situation, resolution of one bilateral interaction would not directly affect the outcomes of
others. See Snidal, Game Theory, supra note 83, at 52–53. With multilateral universalism,
though, each defection may potentially reduce the cooperative payoffs for the remaining
states, reducing the advantages of any universalist arrangement and encouraging further defections.
210. See Felixstowe Dock & Railway Co. v. U.S. Lines Inc., 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 76 (Q.B.
1987).
211. English law did not require any such turnover, but it was within the judge’s discretion. See id. at 76.
212. Not only would English creditors do far better in a territorial distribution, but the
contemplated reorganization would have eliminated the debtor’s European operations and
instead concentrated resources in North America. Assets repatriated from England would
therefore have funded a reorganization benefiting North American trade creditors by preserving commercial relationships with the reorganized entity. English trade creditors, however,
would see no such benefit. See id. at 77.
213. Lord Hoffman explained:
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The French court was willing to turn over assets to the U.S. court
214
only after all French creditors had been paid in full. With little choice,
the U.S. debtor had agreed to these French demands. This capitulation
the English court read as “not only a serious breach of the [debtor’s]
‘single proceedings’ theory, but also a preference (in the interests no
215
doubt of expediency) of one particular group of creditors.” Therefore,
the debtor’s arguments concerning a single insolvency administration
and equal treatment of creditors were seriously undermined.
Numbers problems have particular bite for universalism because
claims concerning its efficiency advantages over territoriality depend on
its widespread, if not universal, adoption. According to its advocates,
universalism offers superior efficiency because it makes the location of
the debtor’s assets irrelevant to creditors’ rights. Universalism therefore
216
provides ex ante predictability to creditors, relieves them of the bur217
dens of ex post monitoring of the debtor’s assets, and facilitates
218
efficient administration of the debtor’s assets.
By contrast, the argument goes, territoriality suffers from the problem of fleeing assets. Creditors cannot possibly predict their bankruptcy
recoveries ex ante because the governing laws will change depending on
the various locations of the debtor’s assets, “which may be spread among
219
many jurisdictions and which may be moved at any time.” Creditors
are therefore forced to monitor the locations of the debtor’s assets at all
times and “must consider the laws of all jurisdictions in which assets are
220
located, or into which assets may move.” Under universalism, only the
home country need be identified, and that determination must surely be

The proposed scheme of reorganization was that the assets removed from England
would be used to keep U.S. Lines going in the United States but that it would withdraw from the European market. This meant that the Felixstowe Dock company [an
English creditor] would gain nothing from the reorganization. Furthermore, it was
clear that the French, who have a highly developed sense of their own national interest, were for similar reasons not going to allow any of the assets in France to be
sent to the United States.
Hoffman, L.J., supra note 171, at 2513.
214. French creditors successfully procured the arrest of two of the debtors ships, and
the French courts would allow sale of the ships and repatriation of proceeds to the United
States. only after all French creditors had been paid. See Felixstowe, 2 Lloyd’s Rep. at 94.
215. Id.
216. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 8, at 2309.
217. See Guzman, supra note 21, at 2207–08.
218. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 8, at 2309.
219. Guzman, supra note 21, at 2207.
220. Id. at 2208.
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simpler and more predictable than monitoring all the debtor’s assets all
221
the time.
The trouble with this neat analysis, of course, is that it assumes the
ubiquity of universalism. Universalism yields superior predictability,
reduces monitoring costs, and renders asset location irrelevant only if all
states adopt it. Otherwise, a debtor may always move its assets beyond
the jurisdiction of the universalist court, just as under territoriality. Even
if many states were to adopt universalism, a highly unlikely prospect, as
shown in previous parts, plenty of amenable jurisdictions would still exist in which debtors might park assets comfortably out of the reach of
creditors. Absent highly unrealistic assumptions about the world, then,
universalism is no better than territoriality with respect to ex ante predictability and monitoring costs. Those arguments for universalism
222
should therefore be put to rest. As important, in a world of incomplete
universalism, the problem of fleeing assets frustrates achievement of the
unified international administration of assets that is at the heart of the
universalist proposal.
Numbers problems suggest that even universalism among a relative
handful of states (never mind ubiquity) is unlikely. However, large multinational firms operate in dozens of states, and such firms will continue
to grow in size and international reach. Even ignoring problems of strategic asset transfer, any universalist arrangements would be inadequate
to handle what will come to be routine international bankruptcies.

V. Generalizing the Analysis: When Is Cooperation Possible?
Conditions of play in international bankruptcy make it highly improbable that multilateral universalism could emerge through simple
reciprocity. International cooperation is possible, however. We observe it
223
in other international prisoners’ dilemma settings, even in the face of
these impediments that plague universalism. However, ready examples
221. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 8, at 2309; Guzman, supra note 21, at
2207.
222. Recently, Jay Westbrook has justifiably retreated a bit from the predictability thesis.
See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 8, at 2326.
223. Behavioral regularities that may resemble cooperation occur in other settings as
well. Many of these settings, however, may instead involve the mere coincidence of states’
interests, coercion of one state by another, or coordination issues. None of these contexts present the difficult mixed motives at work in the prisoners’ dilemma or the concomitant
cooperation problems. See generally Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 86 (discussing various
contexts for behavioral regularities indiscriminately referred to as customary international
law).
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of the decentralized multilateral cooperation envisioned by universalists
224
are scarce. Cooperation that overcomes these hurdles typically occurs
225
within the context of international regimes and institutions. In this Part,
I first discuss international cooperation that we do observe and the role
that regimes and institutions play in facilitating it. Examples from international trade illustrate cooperation that overcomes both vague
226
commitments and problems associated with large numbers. I then explore the possibilities for a universalist regime, briefly re-examining the
227
recently promulgated EU Insolvency Regulation. Unfortunately for
universalists, no universalist regime exists, despite ongoing institutional
efforts at international bankruptcy reform. The EU case suggests possible reasons for this absence of universalism and implies that even
structured approaches to reform will not lead to universalism.
A. A Role for Regimes and Institutions
Vague commitments and multiple parties are not unique to the universalist proposal. Yet in other contexts, cooperation occurs despite these
impediments. Formal institutions can address vague commitments
through processes of norm elaboration. They can solve numbers problems by gathering and disseminating information among member states.
Even in the face of intractable prisoners’ dilemma or deadlock problems
that plague universalism, regimes and institutions can facilitate cooperation through issue linkage. Each of these regime functions I discuss in
turn.

224. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. Theorists suggest that decentralized multilateral cooperation could emerge only under fairly strong assumptions, for example, high
quality information or highly coordinated strategies. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal,
Why States Act through Formal International Organizations, 42 J. Conflict Res. 3, 6 (1998);
Michihiro Kandori, Social Norms and Community Enforcement, 59 Rev. Econ. Stud. 63
(1992).
225. “[I]nternational regimes and institutions acquire a central role in facilitating multilateral cooperation.” Licht, supra note 11, at 76. Stephen Krasner defines a regime as a “set[]
of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which
actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” Stephen D. Krasner,
Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in International Regimes 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983).
226. As for the problem of bankruptcy courts attempting to execute national reciprocity
strategies, see supra Part IV.C., international institutions will not be able to offer much help.
That problem is an internal one for each state to address. States might be able to centralize the
function of identifying cooperative states deserving reciprocity from their domestic courts.
However, this approach may raise other internal problems or may not be feasible because of
internal constraints. See discussion, supra note 194.
227. See EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 157.

3/19/02 10:28 AM

TUNGTYPE.DOC

Fall 2001]

Is International Bankruptcy Possible?

61

1. Norm Elaboration
Institutions provide information and processes that can resolve the
problem of fuzzy commitments. Professors Ken Abbott and Duncan
Snidal refer to this function as “norm elaboration.”228 Bounded rationality
and high transaction and information costs may make it difficult for
states to write complete contracts (i.e., treaties that address all contingencies). Institutions provide processes by which rules and norms are
elaborated, “fleshed out” in the context of particular disputes. The World
Trade Organization (WTO) provides a salient example. While some aspects of international trade rules are specific and the related state policies
relatively transparent, —for instance, compliance with GATT tariff bind229
ings, —a range of trade issues involve standards that raise problems of
230
interpretation and opportunism.
For example, the propriety of antidumping duties turns on
assessments of an imported product’s “normal value” and whether its
231
importation causes “material injury” to a domestic industry. Temporary
relief from import surges, so called “escape clause” relief, is justified
when an importing country experiences increased imports that “cause or
threaten to cause” “serious injury” to a “domestic industry” that
228. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 224, at 15. See also Arthur A. Stein, Coordination
and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World (describing role of regime in “specify[ing]
what constitutes cooperation and what constitutes cheating”), in International Regimes
115, 128 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983).
229. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. II, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. The WTO is the body that administers the
GATT. It has performed this function since its creation in 1994.
230. Scholars routinely model international trade as a prisoners’ dilemma. See, e.g., Axelrod, supra note 101, at 7; Maggi, supra note 206, at 195; Judith L. Goldstein & Stephen D.
Krasner, Unfair Trade Practices: The Case for a Differential Response, Am. Econ. Rev. vol.
74, No. 2 , 282 (May 1984).
231. See GATT, art. VI(1). “Dumping” is the act or practice of cross-border predatory
pricing. That is, a state exports its products at lowball prices in order either to drive out competitors in the importing country or to address a short-term overproduction problem. On the
theory that dumping harms the importing country, GATT rules prohibit the practice, and the
importing country may justifiably impose a duty to offset the margin of dumping. The point of
this tax on the dumped product is to cause an increase in its sale price in the importing country
market, thereby nullifying the unfair advantage it would otherwise have had relative to competing locally produced goods.
Importing states’ latitude to impose duties in the face of alleged dumping, however, creates opportunistic temptations for importing states. GATT therefore attempts to discipline
antidumping duties and to curb the disguised protectionism that might otherwise arise. Under
the GATT, an importing state may levy antidumping duties only on products selling in the
local market at less than “normal value,” and only if such sales “cause[] or threaten[] material
injury to an established industry” or “materially retard[] the establishment of a domestic industry” in the importing state. See GATT, art. VI(1).

3/19/02 10:28 AM

TUNGTYPE.DOC

62

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 23:1

competes with the imported product.232 These terms are all quite
malleable and susceptible of competing interpretations. States may
reasonably disagree about their construction, and these areas present
some of the thorniest trade issues because of the vague standards
involved.
Fortunately for trading nations, the WTO provides a means of clarifying vague commitments and policing disguised trade protection. The
WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) offers a process to re233
solve trade disputes. If consultation fails to resolve a dispute, the DSU
provides for the establishment of a panel of neutral parties to consider
234
the dispute and render a binding decision. Appeal of a panel decision
235
to the WTO Appellate Body is also possible. Through this process, the
WTO clarifies vague standards and distinguishes true violations of trade
obligations from misperceptions. Panels and the Appellate Body gather
and disseminate information concerning alleged violations. The process
resolves ambiguity and promulgates shared understandings about trade
obligations. It facilitates monitoring and reciprocity among interested
236
states, thereby promoting cooperation.
2. Solving Numbers Problems
Regimes and institutions are also useful in overcoming numbers
problems. Moreover, multilateral cooperation typically requires assistance from regimes and formal institutions. Regimes lower the
232. See Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 2(1), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, The Legal Texts: The Results Of The
Uruguay Round Of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 275 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter
The Legal Texts].
233. See generally Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, id. at 354, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
234. See id. art. 6. “Binding” is a relative term, of course. Even the trade retaliation that
a panel may authorize does not ipso facto force a state into compliance with its obligations.
235. See id. art. 17.
236. See Maggi, supra note 206; Weingast, supra note 181, at 458. GATT/WTO relies on
other institutional mechanisms to resolve ambiguity as well. While the DSU offers an adversarial process to resolve specific disputes, GATT/WTO has also institutionalized the Trade
Policy Review Mechanism, a regular and more generalized review of members’ trade policies.
Reviews occur periodically and do not depend on initiation by particular disgruntled states.
See Trade Policy Review Mechanism, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 3, The Legal Texts, supra note 232, at 380 (1994). These
sorts of periodic implementation review further increase information flow among members
and reduce transaction costs to cooperation. For a helpful discussion of implementation review
in the global environmental context, see Kal Raustiala, Compliance and Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 32 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 387 (2000).
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transaction and information costs that otherwise impede multilateral co237
operation. They gather and disseminate information about member
states, facilitating identification of shared interests and lowering the
238
costs of negotiating agreements and monitoring compliance. Regimes
may also facilitate collective enforcement of any agreements reached.
Not only can regimes help to clarify vague commitments, as discussed
above, but they lower the costs of promulgating these standards to multiple parties. Regimes may disseminate information about the compliance
behavior of particular actors as well, facilitating the development and
maintenance of reputations in multilateral settings and increasing the
239
reputational costs of defection. Lower information costs in all these
areas make cooperation payoffs relatively more attractive than defection,
improving the chances of both reaching and sustaining multiparty
agreements. This prospect bolsters the credibility of each state’s ex ante
commitment to any agreement, further advancing the possibilities for
multilateral cooperation.
Again, the WTO provides a useful example. Its success at its function of multilateral information dissemination has made it one of the
most effective of international organizations.
Observers . . . often argue that improving the quality and quantity of information about international trade policy has been one
of the regime’s major contributions. More importantly, without
the provision of data and information concerning members’ trade
policies, behavior could not be effectively monitored and there240
fore the ability to implement regime rules would suffer.
The WTO facilitates multilateral trade negotiations that enable
greater trade liberalization than would occur under bilateral negotia241
tions. In addition, to the extent that multilateral sanctions and
enforcement pressure affect states’ trade behavior, the WTO plays a
242
critical role in both verifying violations and informing third parties.
237. See supra Part IV.D.
238. See Keohane, supra note 86, at ch. 6. See generally Ronald B. Mitchell, Sources of
Transparency: Information Systems in International Regimes, 42 Int’l Stud. Q. 109 (1998).
239. See Paul R. Milgrom et al., The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The
Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 Econ. & Pol. 1 (1990) (describing role of private law merchant in improving reputation system as device to promote honest
trade in early Middle Ages).
240. Jock Finlayson & Mark Zacher, The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers:
Regime Dynamics and Functions, 35 Int’l Org. 561, 587–88 (1981).
241. See Maggi, supra note 206, at 193.
242. See id. at 191.
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These multilateral functions become especially important when power
243
imbalances exist in bilateral relationships.
3. Issue Linkage
Even if the conditions for cooperation do not obtain in a prisoners’
dilemma situation, or even if states are deadlocked—that is, they share
244
no mutual interests at all —all is not lost. A regime may still be able to
induce cooperation by enabling a change in the payoffs of recalcitrant
states, transforming what in isolation would present intractable prisoners’ dilemma or deadlock games into more harmonious interactions.
Linking issues, or embedding difficult negotiations within a larger set of
issues, could reduce discord among states. “[A] given bargain is placed
within the context of a more important long-term relationship in such a
way that the long-term relationship affects the outcome of the particular
245
bargaining process.” The presence of a regime expands the scope of
issues over which member states may negotiate. This broader set of possible trade-offs also creates temporal flexibility, enabling the realization
of payoffs over a longer time horizon than would be possible in the absence of existing institutionalized relationships.
246
The TRIPS agreement, negotiated under the auspices of the Uruguay Round of the GATT, provides a vivid recent example of issue
linkage to overcome intractability. Before TRIPS, industrialized countries and less developed countries (LDCs) were deadlocked over the
issue of intellectual property (IP) protection. IP protection, like bankruptcy law, was a matter for individual states. Many LDCs found no use
for domestic IP laws, surmising that the benefits would go primarily to
industrial country firms and investors, who would reap monopoly profits
from LDC markets. Without local IP laws, LDC markets were flooded
with low-cost unauthorized copies of industrial countries’ products,
243. See id. at 193.
244. See supra note 113.
245. Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 83, at 241. For example, in our original prisoners’
dilemma story, if each prisoner had the ability to harm the other’s family in the event of
squealing, then the prisoners’ decisions on squealing become embedded within a larger set of
relationships. The family linkage effectively changes each prisoner’s payoffs. Promised punishments for squealing would reduce each prisoner’s defection payoffs, so that it would not
pay for either prisoner to squeal. Silence would become the dominant strategy.
The few modest treaty commitments that exist with respect to international insolvency are
embedded in more comprehensive schemes of commercial cooperation. See Fletcher, supra
note 157, at 232 (discussing existing international bankruptcy treaties).
246. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, The Legal
Texts, supra note 232, at 321, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].

3/19/02 10:28 AM

TUNGTYPE.DOC

Fall 2001]

Is International Bankruptcy Possible?

65

which were originally developed, designed, and produced under the protective umbrella of industrial countries’ IP laws. The low-cost copies in
LDC markets crowded out the more expensive industrial country products, to the dismay of industrial country firms.
GATT/WTO facilitated a viable TRIPS agreement by enabling industrial countries to “pay” LDCs for their acceptance of TRIPS.
Payment came in the form of improved access for LDC textile and agri247
cultural exports in industrial country markets. The agreement was
acceptable to industrial countries because in addition to setting minimum
standards for IP protection, TRIPS explicitly relies on the threat of trade
248
retaliation for enforcement. Embedding TRIPS negotiations and enforcement within the greater GATT/WTO trade framework enabled a
trade-off between industrial country IP concerns and LDC export concerns. In addition, tying TRIPS compliance to the basic WTO
enforcement mechanism of trade retaliation made TRIPS attractive from
industrial countries’ perspective. The linkages facilitated by the trade
framework made the TRIPS agreement possible.
As with TRIPS, linkages may be the only hope for facilitating universalism among states with asymmetric preferences. For example,
absent side payments, LDCs may be particularly unreceptive to universalism. Because multinational firms are much more likely to be
headquartered in industrial countries, LDCs may anticipate regularly
having to defer to industrial country bankruptcy regimes. By contrast,
LDCs will only infrequently find themselves as the home country in a
multinational bankruptcy, so their bankruptcy regimes will only infre249
quently govern internationally.
B. A Universalist Regime?
If regimes and institutions aid states in overcoming impediments to
cooperation in other areas, is a similar strategy available for
universalism? States interested in universalism might, for example,
attempt to “piggyback” a universalist initiative on an existing regime in
which they participate. Existing regimes enjoy economies of scale. With
247. See Michael P. Ryan, The Function-Specific and Linkage-Bargain Diplomacy of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 19 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 535, 560 (1998)
(discussing critical issue linkage enabling TRIPS agreement). I refer to “GATT/WTO” because before the Uruguay Round, the WTO did not exist. Instead, the term “GATT” referred
either to the agreement itself or to the informal administration of the agreement that had
evolved over the years since 1947.
248. See DSU, supra note 233, art. 1.
249. See supra note 113.
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an established regime, the marginal cost of dealing with a new issue is
lower than if the issue were to be handled in isolation and from
250
scratch.
Ironically, several international bankruptcy reform projects already
exist—sponsored by major international institutions—and yet no univer251
salist proposal has surfaced. The World Bank, the Asian Development
252
253
Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
and other multilateral institutions already sponsor significant research
254
and reform efforts on bankruptcy law. The International Monetary
Fund has included bankruptcy law reform in its conditionality arrangements with Russia and Southeast Asian nations following their recent
economic crises.255 UNCITRAL has promulgated a Model Insolvency
256
Law that is under consideration for adoption in several countries, in257
cluding the United States. The American Law Institute (ALI) sponsors
an extensive Transnational Insolvency Project involving research and law
258
reform goals among the NAFTA countries. And as previously discussed, the European Union has devised an insolvency regulation to
259
coordinate cross-border bankruptcies within the Union.
Despite these extensive reform projects and initiatives, no universalist instrument exists, even as a model for voluntary adoption. While it
appears that the formal organizations already exist that could aid univer250. While universalist-leaning states might attempt to create a regime specifically to facilitate universalism, regime-building is no small undertaking. The upfront costs of negotiating
and implementing such a regime might easily outweigh the present value of the anticipated
benefits. More likely is the possibility that an existing regime for economic cooperation could
be adapted to incorporate a goal of universalist cooperation. See Keohane, supra note 86, at
100. “[R]egimes are easier to maintain than they are to create.” Id.
251. See UNCITRAL Possible Future Work, supra note 26.
252. See Harmer, supra note 26.
253. See UNCITRAL Possible Future Work, supra note 26, at 7.
254. See id.
255. See Board Receives Report on Russian Program, supra note 26; Recovery from the
Asian Crisis, supra note 26.
256. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency
with Guide to Enactment, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.3, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 30th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/442 (1997). The Model Law merely
permits, but does not require, local courts in an adopting country to cooperate with foreign
insolvency proceedings. Whether the Model Law is a positive development or not is subject to
debate. Compare Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 8, at 2279 (extolling Model Law),
with Stephan, supra note 17, at 786 (“Rather than solving the coordination problem that exists
under current law, the Model Law makes it worse.”).
257. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 8, at 2279.
258. See Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency Law, supra note 59, at 564 (describing project).
259. See supra Part IV.B.1.
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salist cooperation, the absence of universalism in the face of these insti260
tutional efforts begs for explanation. The most recent institutional
pronouncement on cross-border bankruptcy is the EU Insolvency Regulation, and it provides a useful case study for universalist regime
261
possibilities. The EU may represent the best case for regime-based solutions, since the Union involves multiple overlapping commercial,
political, and legal relationships among states, all devised to advance the
262
EU’s multifaceted integrationist goals. With its dense web of institutions and a common commercial framework, the EU ought to be able to
provide whatever norm elaboration, information dissemination, and link263
ages that might be necessary to engender universalism.
However, as earlier discussed, universalism has not emerged in the
EU. Instead, the EU Insolvency Regulation creates a hybrid system in
264
which territoriality may potentially dominate. Historically, the vague265
ness of the universalist commitment has been a serious impediment. In
addition, states have been unwilling to abandon local priority rules. In
early negotiations over an EU insolvency convention, it was “unthinkable” that states would “accept the subordination of the rights and
266
expectations of local creditors” to the insolvency regime of another
state.
The theoretically elegant precepts of the scheme based upon
[universalism] therefore yielded to the political imperatives of
the shared desire on the part of the participating States to defend

260. Granted, the reform projects of the development organizations focus primarily on
bolstering the national bankruptcy laws of LDCs.
261. Because the Regulation does not go into force until May 31, 2002, however, no experience with the Regulation is available to inform our discussion.
262. The major EU institutions are several. In addition to the European Court of Justice
and the Court of First Instance, the EU has its own executive arm, the Commission; the Council, which functions roughly like a European Cabinet; the European Council, which consists of
all EU heads of state; and the European Parliament, a quasi-legislative body. See John H.
Jackson, et al., International Economic Relations 191 (3d ed. 1995).
263. As for numbers problems, the constellation of EU institutions should be as effective
at reducing information costs as any set of international institutions that exist today. Even
performing that function, however, no regime can guarantee that the required mutuality of
interests among members will exist or that the shadow of the future is sufficiently strong. See
supra Part IV.D. In any event, as the discussion in the text shows, even without numbers problems, universalism within the EU seemed to suffer other impediments.
264. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
265. See supra Part IV.B.1.
266. Fletcher, supra note 157, at 254.

TUNGTYPE.DOC

68 Michigan Journal of International Law

3/19/02 10:28 AM

[Vol. 23:1

local practices in matters of the preferential treatment of certain
267
types of claim in the process of distribution on an insolvency.
Is some institutional solution available to facilitate universalism?
Why have EU institutions been unsuccessful at overcoming obstacles to
universalist cooperation? The EU case presents interesting questions for
our proffered regime solution, since it offers both a prisoners’ dilemma
cooperation problem—the vagueness of the home country standard—and
a deadlock problem—states’ insistence on local priorities.
Whether the problem of vague universalist commitments could be
solved by resort to institutional mechanisms is unclear. Recall that the
“home country” question involves more than straightforward norm
elaboration. Clarification of the home country standard through institutional dispute resolution processes may simply encourage more eve-of268
bankruptcy forum shopping, which itself may frustrate states’ expectations ex post or discourage accession to universalism ex ante. So the cure
may be no better than the disease. Perhaps extended norm elaboration
could deter forum shopping by articulating what constitutes impermissible manipulation. On the other hand, if the debtor actually relocates its
center of main interests on the eve of bankruptcy in a blatant attempt at
269
forum shopping, setting the appropriate remedy may be tricky. Nullifying the attempted forum shopping by simply ignoring the eve-ofbankruptcy relocation may not make sense going forward. Vesting home
country jurisdiction in the national courts of a now-former home country
would seem to complicate the conduct of the case, as the debtor’s center
270
271
of main interests is now somewhere else! Complications abound.
267. Id.
268. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
269. “Center of main interests” is the formulation of the home country standard in the
Regulation. See EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 157, art. 3(1).
270. There may be other ways to deter forum shopping, for example, by assigning some
sort of personal liability to corporate officers. This approach, however, might be unacceptable
to some states.
Forum shopping in U.S. bankruptcy has also been an issue. See LoPucki, supra note 189.
However, resolution of that problem is much less critical than in the international context,
since the applicable bankruptcy law is U.S. federal law, which does not vary from one U.S.
state to another. See LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 24, at 2229. Under universalism, of course, a forum shop changes the applicable bankruptcy law.
271. Other possible indeterminacies relate to the interface of home country bankruptcy
law with local nonbankruptcy law. The EU Insolvency Regulation attempts to address this
with a detailed specification of the scope of the home country choice of law rule. See supra
note 149, and accompanying text. In this area, an institutional mechanism for norm elaboration may be helpful for certain recurring issues. However, it is unclear in the context of large
and far-flung multinational firms whether interface issues, inextricably tied to the peculiarities
of local debtor-creditor laws, will recur or whether sui generis issues will predominate, in
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Timing may also be an issue. Any regime-based norm elaboration
process would have to accommodate the peculiar characteristics of bankruptcy proceedings. Their often time-sensitive nature may make
impractical any attempt at international review of particular judicial or
administrative decisions in national bankruptcy proceedings. Especially
as to the crucial question of home country, review of a national court’s
decision by the European Court of Justice may be difficult in light of the
272
exigencies of the case.
What about EU states’ insistence on their local priorities? Such a
stance, of course, produces a territorial system and precludes universalism. States’ refusal to “trade jurisdiction” across cases means that
273
universalist cooperation is impossible. Perhaps resort to EU institutions could ameliorate this deadlock. Issue linkage is a possibility, as
earlier discussed in the context of the pre-TRIPS deadlock. Given the
density of commercial relations among EU states, it may be possible to
incorporate other issues into the negotiations over universalism, such
that objecting states might be granted offsetting concessions in other areas.
Issue linkage, however, is not a simple process. TRIPS was a special
case involving an issue of exceptional significance to powerful interest
groups within industrial countries.
Getting intellectual property onto the MTN agenda was itself no
easy task. Believing that European support would be necessary
and Japanese support helpful in making it happen, the U.S.
Trade Representative recommended to the chairmen of Pfizer
and IBM that they encourage their European and Japanese counterparts to pressure their governments and EC secretariat
leadership to support the idea. Though competitors in global
markets, these companies shared the common interest in improved intellectual property protection around the world,
especially in developing-country markets, and various European
and Japanese trade associations were talked into supporting the
274
initiative.

which case indeterminacies will persist. Perhaps with a manageable number of states, norm
elaboration could over time narrow the range of indeterminate interface issues. Time will tell
whether the EU membership presents a manageable number.
272. This would not preclude the possibility of ex post implementation review. See supra
note 236 (discussing Trade Policy Review Mechanism and implementation review).
273. See supra note 108, and accompanying text.
274. Ryan, supra note 247, at 562 (footnote omitted).
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Political interests associated with other potentially linked issues
might object to any linkage with universalism for fear that it might doom
their pet issues. With the TRIPS negotiations, for example, industrial
country textile and agricultural interests were sacrificed in order to reach
275
an IP deal with LDCs. International bankruptcy is unlikely to command the same urgent attention and quality of domestic political support
as international IP issues. Absent such attention and political support, the
impetus to link universalism to some other prominent issue will be lacking. Moreover, it appears that historically within the EU, the most
276
powerful states insisted on their local priorities. With the powerful
states insisting on territorial prerogatives, it would be difficult for other
277
states to effect any sort of trade across diverse issues.
In the end, the European experience should give us great pause.
Even with the EU’s multifaceted formal institutions and commercial relationships, and its deep economic and political integration, universalist
cooperation has not been forthcoming. Institutional norm elaboration
probably cannot fix the fuzziness of the universalist commitment. In addition, states continue to insist on their territorial prerogatives, which
issue linkage is unlikely to solve. The available evidence suggests that
even the prospects for regime-based universalism are dim.

Conclusion
Predicting the future is always a risky endeavor, and proving a negative is impossible. However, my analysis shows many reasons to doubt
that universalism provides a plausible prescription for international
bankruptcy cooperation. Most states will likely remain territorial in their
approach to cross-border insolvency. Even states with welfare maximizing reasons to prefer mutual universalist cooperation will encounter
tremendous difficulty attempting to establish and maintain universalist
arrangements. Universalism presents them with a prisoners’ dilemma
that is not easily resolved, either through the standard prescription of
repeat play or more elaborate devices.
The hopes of universalist advocates for a decentralized evolution toward universalism are particularly misplaced. The conditions of play in
275. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
276. See Fletcher, supra note 157, at 254.
277. It is unclear whether any of the EU states was willing to compromise on its local
priorities. See id. If no states are willing to compromise on this issue, then even issue linkage
will not help, because all states in effect prefer territoriality.
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international bankruptcy render states unable to make credible commitments or enforce other states’ proffered commitments to universalism.
Even if discount factors and payoff structures were conducive to the
emergence of cooperation, fuzzy commitments and misperception problems, the involvement of judges, and the problem of numbers would
likely overwhelm any attempt at universalism. Even a state that prefers
universalism faces the single-play prisoners’ dilemma, for which defection is its dominant strategy.
Regimes facilitate multilateral bargains that might not otherwise be
possible. However, universalism has not emerged, despite the existence of
several active regime-based international bankruptcy reform projects. Universalists have failed to address this conspicuous absence of universalism
or to describe a plausible route by which regime-based universalism might
appear. Moreover, regimes cannot solve all universalist cooperation problems. As the EU example shows, even strong institutions will not likely be
able to remedy the indeterminacy in the universalist commitment or overcome entrenched territorial predispositions.
Universalism is a sexy idea. Conceptually, it is neat and clean, sim278
ple and sweet. In the face of inexorable globalization, the notion of a
cooperative, internationalist, one-court, one-law bankruptcy system
seems irresistible. In fact, however, states differ in their views of the appropriate goals and means for their bankruptcy regimes. Some states will
refuse to cooperate. Others may be amenable, but conditions make sustained cooperation unlikely. Cooperation is hardly a given; it cannot be
assumed. The universalist proposal seems deceptively straightforward,
but only when much that is interesting, important, and difficult about
international relations and international cooperation is assumed away.
Scholars in other areas have embraced, rather than avoided, the
thorny social and political questions raised by international legal and
regulatory interaction. Bankruptcy scholars should do the same. Scholars
and policymakers in many issue areas are discovering that the optimal
blend of competition and cooperation across international borders must
take account of local custom, culture, and history. Likewise, universalism must give way to more nuanced and more textured approaches.
Territoriality will remain the dominant approach in international bankruptcy for the foreseeable future and maybe forever. Reform efforts
should proceed on that basis, and the terms of the scholarly debate

278. “Universality is a very appealing approach. . . . It is intellectually elegant . . . .”
Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law, supra note 8, at 515.
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should shift accordingly, with territorially-based cooperation as the primary focus.
International bankruptcy is possible, but universalism probably is not.

